Chaos in Central Africa: A Fight for Stability

Introduction

The Central Africa region is one of the most vulnerable and fragile areas of the whole African continent (Meyer, A., 2015). Although nowadays there are only two ongoing civil wars in the region, over the past decades Central Africa has experienced a large number of crises, coups d’état, civil wars, cross-border crimes and terrorist attacks that have increased the level of instability and insecurity. The list of actors involved in these events is not limited to the states constituting the region of Central Africa, but it also includes neighboring countries, as well as non-state actors such as ethnic, rebel and military groups, among others. This paper sheds light on the challenges posed by the current conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, as the two active intrastate wars in the region, and brings forward a series of recommendations for the African Union to take into account in order to restore stability and protect the region from security threats associated with civil wars. 

Historical Background

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo, formerly Zaire) has been plagued by complex conflicts since its independence from Belgium in 1960 (UCDP, 2023). Since 1989, the DRC has faced organized violence from non-state, intrastate, and one-sided categories, with rebel factions fighting the government, one another, and attacking civilians (UCDP, 2023). Political and economic life in Zaire was dominated by President Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled through a system of fear and patronage until the mid-1990s (UCDP, 2023). His decision to revoke the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, a Rwandan Tutsi group in the DRC, heightened tensions and led to a large-scale rebellion in 1996 (UCDP, 2023). In October 1996, the Banyamulenge allied with anti-Mobutu groups to form the AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Rwanda, with some support from Uganda, played a crucial role in both establishing and supporting the alliance (UCDP, 2023). This effort resulted in Mobutu’s overthrow in 1997, after which Kabila became president and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (UCDP, 2023).

Figure 1: Map of Central Africa region (History and Map, 2018).

In 1998, conflict resumed on a larger scale. Divisions between Uganda and Rwanda led former AFDL allies to turn against one another (UCDP, 2023). After years of turmoil, peace negotiations, involving civil society, political opposition, and rebel movements, began in 2002. These efforts culminated in the "Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo," which paved the way for elections in 2006 (UCDP, 2023). Joseph Kabila was elected as the DRC's first democratically elected president in 40 years (UCDP, 2023). During the 2000s, the rebel group March 23 Movement (M23) emerged as a significant force in the eastern region (CFR, 2023). In response, the UN authorized an offensive brigade against the M23, which led to increased Rwandan support for the group and the rise of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) insurgency (Titeca & Fahey, 2016). Over the next seven years, the ADF engaged in numerous conflicts and attacks against civilians until 2019, when it splintered into several factions, continuing the violence (Candland, 2021).

Figure 2: François Bozizé, CAR former president (BBC News, 2020)

The Central African Republic (CAR) experienced significant instability following its independence in 1962, with periods of military rule and authoritarian leadership (UCDP, 2023). A democratic opening occurred in the early 1990s; however, the government failed to address the interests of CAR's diverse ethnic groups, leading to an attempted military coup and armed conflict in 2001 (UCDP, 2023). The government, supported by Libya and rebels from the DRC, resisted the coup (UCDP, 2023). The dismissal of high-ranking officer Francois Bozizé prompted him and his followers to attempt to seize power in 2002 (UCDP, 2023). The following year, Bozizé overthrew the government and initiated a national reconciliation process (UCDP, 2023). In the elections that followed in 2005, Bozizé emerged victorious. However, he faced challenges from rebels who accused him of favoring his own ethnic group (UCDP, 2023). Various groups continued to contest Bozizé’s rule until 2013, when the Seleka alliance, primarily composed of Muslim rebel groups, ousted him (UCDP, 2023). This shift sparked sectarian violence between Bozizé’s militias and Seleka's forces (UCDP, 2023).

Figure 3: The Organization of African Unity (HISTORY OF OUR MISSION, n.d.)

Founded in 2002, the African Union (AU), representing 55 nations, aims to create a "United and Strong Africa." Its 50-year plan, "Agenda 2063," outlines steps to achieve this by 2063 (AU, 2023). Notably, Aspiration 4—“A peaceful and secure Africa”—focuses on peace and security goals for the continent (AU, 2023). To achieve an environment free from insecurity, Agenda 2063 identifies 15 Flagship Programmes focused on major goals like security, economic growth, and infrastructure. One initiative, Silencing The Guns By 2020, addresses civil wars and emphasizes the need to “work towards ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflict and preventing genocide” (AU, 2023). As an organ within the AU, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is responsible for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, aiming to implement the goals of Aspiration 4 and the Silencing The Guns by 2020 initiative. However, the council has struggled with implementation, leading to an extension of the Silencing the Guns initiative until 2030. Despite the AU's commitment and initiatives, notable progress remains necessary in addressing conflicts on the continent.

The Central African Republic: Context and Challenges

The African Union (AU) has been a key player in efforts to stabilize the Central African Republic (CAR) through the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, signed in 2019 in Bangui. This agreement aimed to integrate various parties, including opposition and armed groups, by addressing issues related to disarmament, justice, reconciliation, security, migration, and democratic processes (UNSC, 2019). Although it represented a significant step toward peace, tensions re-emerged during the December 2020 elections. Excluded from governance, certain opposition groups, including a coalition led by former President Bozizé—the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC)—resorted to violence before the election. Russia and Rwanda sent military forces to support the Central African Republic (CAR), but CPC rebels continued their attacks, employing drones and explosives on key trade routes while engaging in clashes with government troops. They also competed with Russian mercenaries, particularly the Wagner Group, a private military company known for providing military support in conflict zones and pursuing resource control (Picco, 2023). Additionally, kidnappings have emerged as a funding source for the CPC (Picco, 2023).

Figure 4: First Meeting of the Organisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa, 1963 (HISTORY OF OUR MISSION, n.d.)

The CAR government’s challenges to stability stem from escalating authoritarianism, financial strain, and internal security divisions. President Touadéra’s push to amend presidential term limits has led to protests, which the government has suppressed in collaboration with Russian forces (Picco, 2023). Additionally, CAR faces a financial crisis: over half of its budget depends on foreign aid, largely suspended by Western partners following Russia’s growing influence (Bax, 2021). Strikes in education, healthcare, and other public sectors have intensified as workers demand better wages, which the government struggles to pay due to reliance on an informal economy and rising inflation (Picco, 2023). Ethnic divisions within CAR’s security forces have further destabilized the region, while frustrations over the conduct of Russian mercenaries and rumors of cuts to military bonuses have raised concerns (Picco, 2023).

Figure 5: President Faustin-Archange Touadéra during peace talks between the South Sudan government and rebel groups in Nairobi on 9 May 2024 (Intelligence, 2024)

Internationally, CAR’s situation is influenced by strained relationships with neighboring Chad and Sudan, which have hosted CPC leaders in exile, as well as deteriorating ties with France and other Western nations, primarily due to Russia's involvement (Robleh et al., 2023; Bax, 2021). Military support from Russia and Rwanda has also been notable, with Rwanda providing significant troop contributions to CAR’s defense and the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic). However, tensions arise from Rwanda’s apprehension regarding Wagner’s operations due to competition over mining resources (International Crisis Group, 2023). Thus, CAR’s internal strife is compounded by international dynamics, as the country navigates complex alliances and conflicts both domestically and globally.

The Democratic Republic of Congo: Context and Challenges

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has seen the resurgence of the M23 rebel group in 2022, following a five-year hiatus, and by mid-2023, M23 had gained control over substantial areas in the North Kivu province. This development reignited tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, with the African Union (AU) supporting allegations of Rwandan involvement in the conflict (CFR, 2023). Attempts to negotiate a ceasefire have failed, leading to ongoing violence in the region. Recent discussions held in Nairobi and Luanda in 2022 and 2023 aimed for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign military forces. They also sought compliance from local armed groups with the newly implemented Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization (PDDRCS) Program (ISS, 2023). This program aims to reintegrate former combatants into society, promote community recovery, and stabilize regions affected by conflict (ISS, 2023). The conflict's complexity is further compounded by the DRC's vast natural resources, which have drawn global interest. Historically, the United States monopolized cobalt mining in the DRC. However, during the Obama and Trump administrations, control shifted to Chinese companies, giving China dominance over most foreign-owned cobalt, uranium, and copper mines in the country (CFR, 2023). This strategic shift has seen the Congolese army (FARDC) deployed to protect Chinese mining interests, positioning China ahead of the U.S. in energy and technology sectors (CFR, 2023).

Figure 6: The DR Congo army is carrying out an operation in the country's northeastern region to root out militant groups (DR Congo Army Says It Has Killed Top Rebel Leader, 2019)

The competition for resources has raised security concerns, particularly for the U.S. and other Western nations, as cobalt plays a crucial role in the transition to electric vehicles (Lipton & Searcey, 2021). With the DRC responsible for 71% of the world's cobalt production, approximately 80% of this output is processed in China (ADF, 2022). The lack of a robust framework governing mineral extraction has hindered the U.S.' competitive stance, while armed groups like CODECO have exploited mining sites for revenue, perpetuating conflict (De Groot et al., 2023). Additionally, private actors engaged in resource extraction often utilize excessive force to protect investments, exacerbate local divisions, and exploit child labor (Le Billon, 2002; Olsson, 2004). This profit-driven approach leads to conflicts of interest that prioritize financial gain over humanitarian concerns, as seen in the Rubaya mine, which was briefly occupied by M23 in February 2023 before being reclaimed by local armed groups (De Groot et al., 2023).

Figure 7: Commanders of the armed group Codeco walk through Linga village in Ituri province, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Ilunga, 2024).

Terrorism poses another significant threat, particularly due to links between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Da’esh, an extremist militant group. Notable incidents, including the killing of 21 civilians in Beni on April 8, 2023, by the ADF, for which Da’esh claimed responsibility, illustrate the growing danger (De Groot et al., 2023). Other attacks, such as an improvised explosive device detonation during an open-air baptism that killed 16 people, further emphasize this risk (De Groot et al., 2023). Links between the ADF and South African cells have also been documented, including financial transfers from Da’esh collaborators in Uganda (De Groot et al., 2023). The inability to address these threats could exacerbate regional instability, similar to the situation in Mali, where unaddressed terrorism contributed to insecurity, culminating in the withdrawal of UN forces (Dieng & Mfondi, 2023; UN News, 2023). The anticipated withdrawal of MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, raises concerns about a potential power vacuum in Eastern DRC (UNSC, 2023).

Figure 8: Allied Democratic Forces' attacks around Beni (El-Bay, 2021)

Despite various efforts to stabilize the situation, M23's expansion has resulted in over a million internally displaced persons and numerous civilian casualties (De Groot et al., 2023). Counteroffensive operations by the FARDC have proven ineffective, often with assistance from the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) (De Groot et al., 2023). By February 2023, M23 controlled double the territory compared to November 2022 (De Groot et al., 2023). The conflict's complexity is heightened by the involvement of multiple actors, including the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), MONUSCO, and private military companies like Congo Protection (De Groot et al., 2023). Rwanda's role is particularly concerning, as it has historically supported M23 to consolidate strategic positions, evidenced by their involvement in M23-held towns and operations in the Masisi territory (De Groot et al., 2023). Intelligence has revealed that Rwanda uses M23 as a proxy to advance its political and economic objectives in Eastern DRC. This involvement intensifies tensions between the two countries, highlighted by incidents such as the RDF shooting down an FARDC plane in Congolese airspace in January (De Groot et al., 2023).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic highlight the significant challenges facing the Central Africa region. Both nations are embroiled in complex webs of violence that stem from historical grievances, ethnic divisions, and international dynamics, exacerbated by external influences and internal governance failures. The African Union, despite its commitments outlined in Agenda 2063, has struggled to effectively address these crises, resulting in a persistent cycle of instability and insecurity.

To promote sustainable peace and security, it is crucial for the African Union to enhance its conflict resolution mechanisms and ensure the effective implementation of peace agreements, such as the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR. Furthermore, addressing the underlying issues of governance, economic inequality, and the proliferation of armed groups is essential for breaking the cycle of violence. Regional cooperation among Central African nations, along with support from international partners, is vital for stabilizing the region and fostering a climate conducive to lasting peace. Ultimately, without decisive and coordinated action, the prospects for a peaceful and secure Central Africa remain bleak, underscoring the urgent need for renewed commitment to conflict prevention and resolution initiatives.

Bibliographical References

ADF (2022). In DRC, China uses military aid, corruption to protect mining interests. Africa Defense Forum. https://adf-magazine.com/2022/11/in-drc-china-uses-military-aid-corruption to-protect-mining-interests/

African Union Peace and Security Council, (2022, October 31). Communique adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1116th meeting held on 31 October 2022 on the situation in the Central African republic (CAR) and the operations of the African Union Military Observer Mission in Central African Republic (MOUACA). Retrieved from 1116.comm1-en.pdf (peaceau.org)

Agenda 2063 The Africa We Want: Popular version. (2015, September). African Union. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36204-doc-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf 

Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. (n.d.). African Union. https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview 

AU in 2023: closing the gap between intention and action? (2023, January 4). ISS Africa. Retrieved from https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-in-2023-closing-the-gap-between-intention and-action

Bax, P., (2021, December 3). Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic, International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic

Candland, T., Fink, A., Ingram, H., Poole, L., Vidino, L., Weiss, C. (2021). The Islamic State in Congo. The George Washington Program on Extremism, 1-53. 

Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo | Global Conflict Tracker. (2023). Global Conflict Tracker, on Foreign Relations. tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo  President https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict

De Groof, M., Behalal, J., Mangan, F., Trujillo, M., Varga, K., Zounmenou, D. (2023). Letter dated 13 June 2023 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the of the Security Council. S/2023/431, https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/123/80/PDF/N2312380.pdf?OpenElement. 

Dieng, M., Mfondi, A. G. (2023). UN troops to withdraw from Mali: what will change in terms of security. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/un-troops-to-withdraw-from-mali what-will-change-in-terms-of-security-209765. 

Flagship Projects of Agenda 2063. (n.d.). African Union. https://au.int/en/agenda2063/flagship projects

Government urged to support safe withdrawal of UN Mission from Mali. (2023). UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142682. 

International Crisis Group. (2023, July 7). Rwanda’s growing role in the Central African Republic. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic

Eastern DRC peace processes miss the mark | ISS Africa. (n.d.). ISS Africa. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark

Le Billon, P., Sherman, J., & Hartwell, M. (2002, May). Controlling resource flows to civil wars: a review and analysis of current policies and legal instruments. In Background Paper for the International Peace Academy “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars” Project Conference Policies and Practices for Regulating Resource Flows to Armed Conflicts. Rockfeller Foundation Study and Conference Center

Lintzer, M. (2023). Shedding light on real owners in DRC mining sector. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/shedding-light-real-owners-drcmining-sector

Lipton, E., Searcey, D., & Gilbertson, A. (2021, December 7). How the U.S. Lost Ground to China in for Clean Energy. The https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/21/world/us-china-energy.html New York Times.

Meyer, A. (2015). Central Africa Report: Preventing conflict in Central Africa ECCAS caught between ambitions, challenges and reality. Institute for Security Studies. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193351/CentralAfricaReportNo3.pdf 

Olsson, O., & Fors, H. C. (2004). Congo: The prize of predation. Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 321-336. 

Picco, E., (2023, March 22). Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?, International Crisis Group. Retrieved from Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis? | Crisis Group

Robleh, M.,  Briollais, N., & Tryba, P., (2023, February 6). Conflict Diagnostic: Central African Republic 2023. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/conflict diagnostic-central-african-republic-2023 

Titeca, K., & Fahey, D. (2016). The many faces of a rebel group: the Allied Democratic Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo. International Affairs, 92(5), 1189-1206.

UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (n.d.-c). https://ucdp.uu.se/country/482 

UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (n.d.-d). https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/283 UN Security Council (December 2022). Resolution 2666 (2022) , S/RES/2666, https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/resolution_2666_2022_0.pdf 

UN Security Council (October 2023). Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2023/5, https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/306/08/PDF/N2330608.pdf?OpenElement

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2023, October 30).  Central African Republic: Situation Report. Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic situation-report-30-oct-2023-0

United Nations Security Council, (2019, February 15). Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. Retrieved from Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, February 2019 (S/2019/145) - Central African Republic | ReliefWeb

Visual Sources

Cover Image: European Union and African Union research and innovation ministers meet for the first time. (n.d.). AfriAlliance. https://afrialliance.org/knowledge-hub/water-and-climate-updates/european-union-and-african-union-research-and-innovation

Figure 01: History and map. (2018, May 16). UNOCA. https://unoca.unmissions.org/en/history-and-map

Figure 02: BBC News. (2020, December 20). François Bozizé: CAR former president denies “attempted coup.” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55387951

Figure 03: HISTORY OF OUR MISSION. (n.d.). Africanunion-un. https://www.africanunion-un.org/history

Figure 04: HISTORY OF OUR MISSION. (n.d.). Africanunion-un. https://www.africanunion-un.org/history

Figure 05: Intelligence, A. (2024, October 31). Central African Republic : President Touadéra seeks to build pro-Western foreign policy to loosen Wagner's grip - 02/07/2024 - Africa Intelligence. Africa Intelligence. https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2024/07/02/president-touadera-seeks-to-build-pro-western-foreign-policy-to-loosen-wagner-s-grip,110253462-eve

Figure 06: DR Congo army says it has killed top rebel leader. (2019, December 1). CGTN. https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2019-12-01/DR-Congo-army-says-it-has-killed-top-rebel-leader-M3hPfIi3GU/index.html

Figure 07: Ilunga, P. (2024, September 21). Codeco militia adds to Congo’s peace bid woes. The EastAfrican. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/codeco-militia-adds-to-congo-peace-bid-woes-4770030

Figure 08: El-Bay, B. L. B. a. D. (2021, June 13). Allied Democratic Forces: The Ugandan rebels working with IS in DR Congo. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57246001