Navigating Vulnerability and Ethnic Conflict: Post-Tsunami Disaster Response and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka

While Sri Lanka is no stranger to natural disasters, the island (and its east in particular) was heavily affected by the Indian Ocean Boxing Day Tsunami in December 2004, a megadisaster that resulted in more than 230,000 deaths (Birkmann, 2007). The post-disaster reconstruction and various international responses brought to light new arenas of conflict fueled by different agendas of the actors involved in the stabilization process, as the crisis and subsequent relief and recovery efforts also overlapped with the ongoing civil war. 

This article critically examines how the post-tsunami reconstruction process in Sri Lanka, particularly in conflict-affected regions, was shaped and complicated by ethnic tensions, resource distribution disparities, and territorial preservation, thereby exacerbating vulnerabilities and hampering equitable recovery in Sri Lanka following Boxing Day (December 26th) 2004. In doing so, this article aims to tackle two ancillary questions, specifically:

1. What made the most affected group in the Boxing Day Tsunami so vulnerable?

2. How did the present conflict and ethnic battles influence the adaptive capacity of different ethnic groups?

The main focus will be on Eastern Sri Lanka, the most affected area by the natural disaster in December 2004. The article will mainly investigate if ethnic/religious factors influenced the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of different groups and how ethnicity affected the post-disaster stabilization processes in the recovery and reconstruction process. Other social, political, economic, demographic, and ecological factors that influence vulnerability/adaptive capacity will be mentioned but not thoroughly investigated due to the lack of space and scope of the article.

Socio-Economic and Socio-Political Landscape in the Pre-Tsunami Era

The Sri Lankan population has been historically divided into ethnic and religious factions, separating the country geographically. According to the 2001 Department of Census and Statistics, in 2002 Sri Lanka’s ethnic composition was as follows: 74% Sinhalese (primarily Buddhist), 18% Tamil (mainly Hindu), and 7% Muslim (Kuhn, 2009). Each group resided in large proportions along the coastline. Yet, their livelihoods and vulnerability were conditioned and influenced by the local socio-political and economic systems, local typography, and most importantly, the ethnic-nationalist conflict (Kuhn, 2009). After the independence from Great Britain in 1948, the Tamil population was gradually marginalized, accelerated by the abolition of all minority rights. In contrast, the historically discriminated Singhalese majority was now experiencing various economic and social advantages. These factors led to the formation of the LTTE insurgent movement. Shortly after the LTTE emerged, the Sri Lankan military forces began their armed fight against them (Stokke, 1998). The conflict caused the deaths of more than 70,000 people and the displacement of between 500,000 and 1 million (Lund & Blaikie, 2010). At the time of the tsunami, the Sri Lankan government had been battling the LTTE for more than twenty-five years. This prolonged civil war significantly weakened the adaptive capacity of different ethnic groups, particularly the Tamils, who were caught between the impacts of the natural disaster and the ongoing war. The government's focus on its "terrorist problem" (Choi, 2015) left many communities more vulnerable to the effects of the tsunami, as resources were stretched thin and aid distribution was often unequal, exacerbating pre-existing tensions and divisions. Therefore, the intersection of the tsunami with the ethnic conflict deepened the vulnerabilities of marginalized groups and hindered their ability to adapt and recover effectively.

Figure 1. Damaged buses piled up in a town square in Galle, Sri Lanka (REUTERS/Carlos Barria, 2004).

Climate Change: Development, Challenges, and Recovery Strategies

The tsunami affected all of Sri Lanka’s 14 coastal districts. The official death toll was 31,000, with around one million people (5% of the total population) directly affected by the tsunami and 180,000 (about 1% of the population) displaced temporarily or permanently (Kuhn, 2009). The impact on death tolls and housing damages was highest in the mixed Tamil and Muslim areas of the Eastern Provinces, which directly faced the source of the wave in Sumatra (Kuhn, 2009). As Khasalamwa (2009) points out, international literature on disaster responses indicates that the people who suffer most are those who are already vulnerable in terms of their exposure to risk and their capacity to respond to significant setbacks. The 2004 tsunami mainly impacted poor communities living in substandard housing near the sea, close to a livelihood of menial labor related to fishing, which can amount to a "geography of vulnerability" (Khasalamwa, 2009). Part of the problem was due to earlier "development" policies and strategies, which exposed some communities to a greater risk of natural disasters—as was the case for poor people living in shanty towns who lived close to the shore for subsistence fishing purposes (Nadarajah & Mulligan, 2011). 

Sri Lanka had a dual-state structure, which was an outcome of the ongoing ethnic conflict. Run by the LTTE, a parallel state was confined to some areas in the Northern and Eastern provinces, covering the entire Mullaitivu districts and parts of the Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara districts (Uyangoda, 2005). The response of these two entities to the tsunami disaster revealed the different capacities they possessed in managing sudden and complex humanitarian disasters. All the reports indicate that the Sri Lankan state reacted slowly to the event, leading to missed opportunities to reduce the human cost of the tsunami disaster. Two examples illustrate the state's unpreparedness and incapacity to respond quickly. First, state institutions completely failed to warn people in coastal areas, even after the tsunami waves had reached the island's eastern coast. Alongside the administrative incapacity, the Sri Lankan state also lacked the political ability to respond immediately to the tsunami disaster (Uyangoda, 2005).

Figure 2. Waves wash through houses at Maddampegama, about 60 kilometers (38 miles) south of Colombo, Sri Lanka, on December 26, 2004 (AP Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe, 2004).

Unlike India, which had previously implemented a policy for responding to natural disasters, Sri Lanka had made no such preparations (Nadarajah & Mulligan, 2011). The most significant review after the tsunami came from the London-based Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), revealing that little was known about coordinating relief efforts for affected communities' recovery (Nadarajah & Mulligan, 2011). Following the disaster, discussions on "vulnerability" and the slogan "build back better" were prevalent (Nadarajah & Mulligan, 2011). However, in one study, Khasalamwa (2009) argued that the "asset replacement" strategy adopted by most relief and aid agencies could never truly "build back better," as it failed to address the pre-existing vulnerabilities of affected communities or the underlying reasons for inequities in access to essential assets. Khasalamwa also pointed out that while international aid agencies made a transparent deal with the Sri Lankan government, the actual outcome was far different (Khasalamwa, 2009).

Another weakness in Sri Lanka's recovery effort highlights the weak governance capacity and public sector across all levels, from local to national (Mulligan & Shaw, 2007). For example, the pre-tsunami declaration of a "no-build" coastal buffer zone severely impacted resettlement processes, as insufficient research had been conducted to identify suitable relocation alternatives (Abe, 2011). Additionally, the affected communities had no input in decision-making processes within state and non-state agencies. Although human rights were part of the discourse, they were not implemented due to ethnic polarization and conflicting political agendas (Silva, 2009). This failure to integrate aid delivery strategies with broader, long-term economic development plans exemplifies the overall failure to coordinate physical and social planning for resettlement (Nadarajah & Mulligan, 2011).

Despite the immense international response to the Indian Ocean Boxing Day tsunami, the flow of international assistance led to increased rivalry among organizations involved in relief and rehabilitation, and it deepened polarization between opposing parties (Silva, 2009). The ongoing civil war further complicated short- and long-term recovery, beginning with the unequal distribution of aid to affected Sri Lankan communities, which worsened pre-existing inter-ethnic and inter-communal tensions and divisions (Nadarajah & Mulligan, 2011).

Figure 3. Thousands of tsunami survivors in Sri Lanka are now living in transitional shelters, built as an interim measure while they await permanent housing (UNHCR/H.J.Davies, 2005).

Concepts and Theories of Climate Vulnerability

The concept of vulnerability is examined from various disciplines, fields, and perspectives, resulting in multiple definitions and related terms, such as adaptation, exposure, risk, and resilience. How one defines vulnerability shapes who is included or excluded, whose voices are heard, and which strategies are prioritized. As previously stated, this article seeks to address two key questions: what made the most affected group in the Boxing Day tsunami so vulnerable, and how did the ongoing conflict and ethnic battles impact the adaptive capacity of different ethnic groups? To explore this, it draws on the IPCC’s model of vulnerability, which consists of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Engle, 2011), and O’Brien et al.'s concept of contextual vulnerability, which emphasizes a processual, multidimensional understanding of climate-society interactions (O’Brien et al., 2007). By doing so, the article investigates why certain groups were more affected by the tsunami than others and how vulnerability shaped their ability to adapt. Additionally, it employs Eriksen’s framing of adaptation as inherently political (Eriksen et al., 2015) to explain the connection between conflict and adaptation in Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami.

Significantly, risks related to social aspects compose a huge aspect of all causes of vulnerability (Birkmann, 2011). This supports O’Brien et al.’s findings of context vulnerability, meaning that hazard vulnerability is largely socially constructed, as it is predominantly social factors that lead to vulnerability (O’Brien et al., 2007). Similarly, the concept of socio-ecological crises also draws attention to the critical interactions between society and nature that shape the crises, as social and economic factors alone are not enough to explain such crises (Birkmann, 2011). The recovery process following the 2004 tsunami produced a significant psychological and socially related vulnerability, especially among people who are most affected by the recovery, i.e., displaced persons (Larsen et al., 2009). 

Figure 4. Aftermath of Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sri Lanka (UN Photos, 2005).

Vulnerability Analysis 

In the aftermath of the Boxing Day Tsunami, one can see distinct patterns of social, infrastructural, and ecological vulnerability. The vulnerability was driven by several different factors, which include physical parameters such as the distance to the coast, topography of the area, and density of the population exposed; socio-economic parameters such as household income, the type and diversity of livelihood; and socio-cultural parameters such as age and gender (Kuhn, 2009). Lack of technical early warning capacities, as well as weak local government institutions with poor response capacities for the provision of basic urban services and lack of access to services by most people, are also factors that influenced the Sri Lankan development process and increased vulnerability (Caldecott & Wickremasinghe, 2005).

Not surprisingly then, on the day of the tsunami, stark regional differences in coastline vulnerability and damage reflected Sri Lanka's ongoing civil war. The national Sri Lankan population distribution of the coastal districts affected by the tsunami was 61% Sinhalese, 21% Tamil, and 17% Muslim (Kuhn, 2009). This goes to show that both Tamils and Muslims were disproportionately impacted by the tsunami compared to the Sinhalese (Kuhn, 2009). Both Muslims and Tamil communities lived in vulnerable coastal areas; however, Tamil neighborhoods were more vulnerable as they were situated on sand bars between the ocean and coastal lagoons, which resulted in complete losses of housing and property and some of the highest mortality rates (Kuhn, 2009). Several factors of the continuing conflict in Eastern Sri Lanka, particularly Sinhalese villages, LTTE guerilla camps, and military closures, had constrained Tamil inland settlement options (Kuhn, 2009). As a result, there was a high concentration of Tamil populations, notably in Muslim- and Sinhala-dominated districts, in vulnerable coastal locations with water on all sides (Kuhn, 2009). 

Figure 5. Waves crash through houses at Maddampegama, Sri Lanka, on December 26, 2004 (AP Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe, 2004).

In effect, the burdens faced by the Tamil population following the tsunami—which were not random but a result of discriminatory policies pursued by the government and differential treatment coming from aid agencies—left the Tamil communities even more vulnerable (Kuhn, 2009). Research on the case has identified a total of 137 substantiated vulnerability insights, with social and institutional factors and risks dominating among the identified vulnerabilities, and most of them emerging during the recovery, with the external intervention being the most dominating driving factor (Larsen et al., 2009). More specifically, 75% of all vulnerabilities identified emerged during the recovery, and half of these were related to aid delivery (Larsen et al., 2009). That is because, in the aftermath of the tsunami, foreign assistance efforts placed considerable emphasis on the less heavily affected communities in the Southern Province, at the expense of more heavily affected areas of the Eastern Province (Kuhn, 2009).

Here, scholars like Ashcroft et al. (2000) argue that the colonial experience creates enduring inequalities that significantly influence the vulnerabilities faced by different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka today. The Sri Lankan government’s reconstruction policies often favored Sinhalese-dominated areas, further entrenching historical inequalities and deepening resentment among marginalized groups, particularly Tamils and Muslims (Ashcroft et al., 2000). However, some scholars, such as John Locke (2005), emphasize that while historical factors are important, they should not overshadow the agency of contemporary communities in shaping their futures. Locke argues for a focus on local resilience and adaptability, suggesting that communities can overcome historical disadvantages through grassroots initiatives and local governance. An example from the case study of Sri Lanka's reconstruction after the 2004 tsunami that supports John Locke's idea of local resilience and adaptability can be seen in the efforts of grassroots organizations and community-led initiatives in the aftermath of the disaster. After the tsunami, many affected communities, particularly in the eastern and northern regions where the Tamil and Muslim populations reside, faced significant challenges in accessing aid and resources. In response to this marginalization, local NGOs and community groups emerged to advocate for their needs. For instance, the Foundation for Co-Existence played a crucial role in bringing together diverse ethnic groups to collaborate on recovery efforts, emphasizing shared interests and communal resilience.  

Nevertheless, Eriksen and others have emphasized the idea that the “relative security of some social groups is achieved through the production of insecurity among others” (Eriksen et al., 2015). It is clear to see that in the reconstruction phase following the Indian Ocean tsunami, international aid and external assistance altered the vulnerability of certain groups and even created new ones for others (Birkmann, 2007). Since the tsunami, many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not yet been able to return home but have been forced to turn to refugee camps instead (Birkmann, 2007). This shows how the tsunami created a new wave of vulnerable people (IDPs), adding to those who already were vulnerable due to the hostilities between the government and the LTTE (Birkmann, 2007). Overall, the tsunami, and particularly the relief and reconstruction stages, generated new threats to Sri Lanka’s fragile ceasefire agreement, first by prioritizing tsunami-affected communities over other neighborhoods that were unaffected by the disaster but were nevertheless very poor and affected by the civil conflict (Birkmann, 2007). 

Figure 6. The coastline of the southwestern city of Kalutara, Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004, shortly after the moment of tsunami impact (AP Photo/DigitalGlobe, 2004).

Adaptive Capacity Analysis 

The idea that all adaptation is political and decisions, processes, and interventions are embedded in arrangements of authority (Eriksen et al., 2015) was proven again and again during the reconstruction phase. The technologies of disaster nationalism were not only aimed at protecting and maintaining existing infrastructures but also sought to build new ones (Choi, 2015). These included the construction of new buffer and border zones, national disaster early-warning systems, the maintenance of military checkpoints, and other state-employed technologies of control (Choi, 2015). The World Bank assessed the cost of reconstruction and recovery at approximately 1.5 billion USD. How to allocate these funds emerged as one of the biggest hurdles between the government and the LTTE. Overcoming them required the LTTE to establish a joint Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS), a framework to work in cooperation with the Sri Lankan state to ensure fair, swift, and smooth distribution of aid to all communities (Klitzsch, 2014). The PTOMS would facilitate reconstruction in the northern and eastern parts of the tsunami-affected country that were under the control of the Tigers, while the Tigers insisted on as much autonomy as possible from the government in the distribution of aid (Choi, 2015). Critically, while external assistance was essential, it often necessitated cooperation with the government. Legal and political restrictions prevented direct aid from reaching the LTTE, and the international donor community hesitated to support such arrangements, fearing that aid would benefit the LTTE, labeled as a terrorist organization (Uyangoda, 2005; Klitzsch, 2014). This scenario underscores how decisions about aid allocation are influenced more by foreign policy and geopolitical considerations than by the immediate needs on the ground.

Thus, the concept of adaptation as political (Eriksen et al., 2015) can also be seen in the foreign aid response linked to tsunami-ridden Sri Lanka, which provided differential net benefits to the dominant party in the conflict and specifically to areas supporting the ruling party (Goodhand, Klem, et al., 2005). In areas of the Amparai district in the Eastern province, where the Muslim community has suffered massive losses, the state intervention in providing relief and other immediate needs has been minimal. At the same time in the south, the northern and northeastern areas were perceived as "receiving a disproportionate amount of assistance," which fueled the already-existing inter-ethnic tensions (Goodhand, Klem, et al., 2005). The mostly donor-funded building initiative in Hambantota and Matara Districts in Southern Province provided a vehicle for displaying bias not just toward the east but also toward the nearby Galle District (Kuhn, 2009). This bias reflected the political, party-based nature of aid distribution in Sri Lanka: areas such as Hambantota that were supportive of the current ruling party received substantially greater support, while the greater level of vulnerability among opposition-led Tamil communities was mostly overlooked (Kuhn, 2009).

Figure 7. Tsunami at Galle- Coastal cities of Sri Lanka in December 2004. a) Tsunami at Galle (Left); b) Inundatedbuildings at the heart of the city and devastated bus terminal (Right) (Tilak Priyadarshana, 2016)

Consequently, Eriksen (2015) argues that how adaptation addresses social injustice and fundamental inequities in resource distribution will always be disputed and dependent on specific knowledge, authorities, and subjectivities. Thus, what is considered adaptive for one group can be maladaptive for another, as not all these changes are desirable to everyone (Eriksen et al., 2015). The "buffer zone" policies from the reconstruction stage are a great example to support Eriksen’s argument. The government announced a 200-meter no-build zone along the east coast in contrast to a narrower 100-meter buffer zone along the south coast, where homes of the Sinhala majority are most numerous (Hyndman, 2007). Before the tsunami, during periods of intense conflict, these unoccupied shores were places where many Muslim and Tamil communities had found sanctuary (Hyndman, 2009). Not only that, but the land within the buffer zone could still be used for business purposes, as hotels were allowed to be rebuilt less than 10 meters from the high tide watermark (Hyndman, 2009). Thus, it comes as no surprise that these policies created resentment among minority ethnic groups ever since they were first announced, as Muslim and Tamil groups called the buffer zones unfair and a sign of ethnic prejudice (Hyndman, 2007). 

Crucially, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) emphasizes the importance of understanding how overlapping identities compound discrimination, providing a nuanced perspective that challenges single-axis analyses of oppression. In the aftermath of the tsunami, aid distribution reflected these intersecting identities. For instance, while Sinhalese-majority regions received substantial support, areas populated by Tamils and Muslims often faced delays and insufficient assistance. The Muslim community in the Amparai district, for example, experienced significant losses but received minimal state intervention. This disparity highlights how pre-existing socio-political dynamics influenced the effectiveness of aid and recovery efforts.

Contrasting viewpoints also exist. Scholars like Michael K. Brown et al. (2003) argue that an overly intersectional approach can dilute the focus on specific forms of systemic inequality. They suggest a need for balance between intersectional analysis and targeted strategies that address particular injustices faced by distinct groups. Grassroots initiatives played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue between communities and government authorities, ensuring that marginalized voices were heard (Uyangoda, 2005). These initiatives organized community meetings, developed localized recovery plans, and mobilized volunteers to assist in rebuilding efforts. This local agency not only empowered communities to take charge of their recovery but also fostered a sense of solidarity among different ethnic groups, countering divisions exacerbated by historical injustices (Goodhand & Klem, 2005). By focusing on local resilience and adaptability, these initiatives demonstrate that communities can overcome historical disadvantages through proactive engagement and collaboration. This aligns with Locke's argument about the importance of agency in shaping their futures (Locke, 2005).

Figure 8. The Central Galle Bus Station after the tsunami and now (World Bank, n.d.).

Conclusion

In an attempt to showcase how the battles over ethnic identity, distribution of benefits, and preservation of (claimed) ethnic territory severely complicated these processes and increased different groups’ vulnerability, this article focused on the (de)stabilization processes following the 2004 Indian Ocean Boxing Day Tsunami in Sri Lanka. The findings showed that many post-tsunami reconstruction projects have not been planned in such a way as to reduce conflicts and tensions but rather thought according to political affiliations, power systems, and preferences. Consequently, the already-existing vulnerabilities, as well as the ones created as a result of unfair and conflict-insensitive aid delivery, resource distribution, and policy-making processes, have heightened even more.

In conflict-prone settings, disaster response and reconstruction efforts must integrate both post-conflict and post-disaster recovery approaches to address both the immediate needs of affected communities and the complexities of the conflict-disaster nexus. Harrowell and Özerdem (2019) emphasize that post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and post-disaster reconstruction (PDR) should not be treated as separate processes, as doing so can exacerbate tensions between conflict-affected and disaster-affected groups. Integrating these efforts requires a context-specific approach that considers local political dynamics and ensures equitable resource distribution (Barakat & Zyck, 2010). The answer to our first question then, lends its lessons from the preceding conflict in Sri Lanka and the similarities of lived experiences in disaster resembling those in conflict.

Hence, conflict-sensitive programming is crucial in such environments to avoid reinforcing grievances and further violence (Khalil et al., 2017). This can be achieved by involving local actors in decision-making processes, thus fostering local ownership and ensuring that interventions are relevant and sustainable (Barakat & Zyck, 2010). Additionally, coordination between humanitarian aid and peacebuilding efforts is essential to address both the immediate needs of disaster recovery and the root causes of conflict (Fan, 2013). The integration of PDR and PCR approaches also requires a conceptual framework that addresses the links between disaster risks and conflict dynamics. This framework should recognize how natural hazards can exacerbate conflict and how disaster resilience can serve as a tool for upstream conflict prevention (Harris et al., 2013). However, this integration remains challenging in practice due to fears of politicization, where addressing conflict issues in disaster recovery may slow down the response process (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2019). This also explains how the adaptive capacity of different groups and regions was highly dependent on existing power relations, which themselves were shaped and reshaped by physical and political conflict, answering our second introductory question.

To overcome these challenges, more flexible and adaptive aid models are needed, allowing for rapid adjustments to changing conditions in conflict-prone environments (Harris et al., 2013). Social cohesion should also be prioritized during reconstruction, as inclusive governance and intergroup dialogue can help rebuild trust and prevent further conflict (Pelling & Dill, 2010).

For Sri Lanka, then, to become prepared for disasters and strengthen its communities’ resilience and their capacity to cope, adapt, and reorganize following unexpected emergencies is highly dependent on working constructively with conflict (UNDP, 2005). How that will be achieved is yet to be determined, especially given the political nature of adaptation processes (Eriksen et al., 2015), which can so clearly be seen in this case study in a country that has been thorned by political and ethnic battles. 

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Visual References