Democracy Beyond Borders: The Promise and Pitfalls of Transnational Actor Engagement

Introduction

The end of the Cold War marked the world into an age of increased globalization. This shift created a demand for multilateralism and interdependence by promoting cooperation through various international organizations (IOs). Over time, international cooperation evolved from its initial intergovernmental nature to encompass multiple types of actors beyond governmental control (Scholte, 2011). From multinational corporations to non-governmental organizations, these transnational actors (TNAs) have become increasingly involved in decision-making processes at the international level. The rising importance of international organizations and TNAs has wide-ranging implications for our understanding of governance and accountability.

One key implication concerns the nature of democracy, which lies at the heart of accountability. Specifically, moving beyond the state and recognizing the growing importance of TNAs means that democratic control at the national level is no longer sufficient, as it cannot account for all decisions made by international organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Therefore, there must be a framework to meet democratic needs at the international level. This demand goes beyond a mere functional argument—i.e., the regulation of international organizations—and also includes a constructivist perspective, which holds that the norms and values associated with democracy are essential for enhancing the credibility of IOs (Dingwerth et al., 2019). This article examines three competing approaches to global democracy: confederalism, federalism, and polycentrism. Moreover, it focuses on the role of transnational actors in improving democratic accountability, examining both promises and pitfalls.

Figure 1: UN Photo. (2017). United Nations flags [Photograph]. Flickr.

Models of global democracy

There is little consensus on the definition of global democracy. One way to begin this discussion is to envision democratic accountability in the international sphere “as the vision of a system of global governance that is responsive and accountable to the preferences of the world’s citizens and works to reduce political inequalities among them” (Archibugi et al., 2012, p. 8). This is a very “thin” definition that does not presuppose concrete democratic characteristics—that is, it sets a minimal standard for what counts as democratic without requiring institutional specifics. However, it can encompass various models of democratic global governance, despite their theoretical distance from the ideal.

Conferalism

The most distant model in terms of compatibility is confederalism (Archibugi et al., 2012). It involves democratically organized states that cooperate based on intergovernmental principles, where citizens or organizations have very limited access to direct decision-making processes. Decisions are reached by consensus, and there is fundamentally no coercive element. Some form of confederalism is most commonly used in the constitutional frameworks of various international organizations (Archibugi et al., 2012). One example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where all member states have equal weight and engage in consultations to reach consensus-based decisions (NATO, 2022). Another example is the European Union, where the European Council—one of the EU’s governing bodies—operates on a confederal basis (European Council).

Despite its prevalence, confederalism is a statist approach (Archibugi et al., 2022). It is considered democratic only to the extent that citizens can participate through domestic democratic processes. As such, it neglects the existence of transnational actors and their role in global governance, as well as the need for citizens’ direct involvement in the international arena.

Figure 2: Lek, S. (2017). European Parliament building in Brussels [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons.

Federalism

Federalism, positioned at the opposite end of the spectrum, most closely aligns with the ideal of global democracy (Archibugi et al., 2012). This model presupposes a degree of federal balancing, involving a great extent of decentralization, but generally allows citizens direct control through equal voting. Moreover, the institutional design of a federal entity closely mirrors that of a typical state, including the presence of coercive mechanisms (Archibugi et al., 2012). The concepts of majority and minority rule are clearly defined and central to the decision-making process.

As a result, this model involves the highest level of integration and, as such, is rarely applied in practice (Archibugi et al., 2012). However, the European Union partially relies on this model. For example, the European Parliament is directly elected and, in many ways, functions like the national parliaments of its member states: it sets the agenda, supervises other institutions, and performs legislative duties through majority voting (EU). Despite this federal-like structure, it is counterbalanced by other bodies, particularly the Council of the EU, which operates more in a confederal manner.

Thus, on one hand, confederalism fails to acknowledge the post-statist character of international cooperation (Scholte, 2011); on the other hand, federalism is nearly impossible to implement at the global level (Archibugi et al., 2012). Therefore, a polycentric model, which builds upon the confederalist approach and aims to bridge the gap to the ideal of global democracy, emerges as a viable compromise in response to the limitations of implementing federalism.

Figure 3: Huwaidi, J. (2000). Council of Europe interior [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons.

Polycentrism

Polycentrism begins with the premise that states do not fully represent society and that confederalism fails to provide adequate representation. However, since federalism remains challenging to implement, improved citizen representation can be achieved by incorporating various non-state actors (Archibugi et al., 2012). These can include business associations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and advocacy networks. Representation can be improved by linking global and regional issues to those affected, whether a trade union, a regional NGO, or another transnational actor (Archibugi et al., 2012).

The argument for including TNAs stems from the observation that, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of their involvement in discussions within international institutions (Tallberg et al., 2014). Thus, this trend provides empirical evidence of the expanding role TNAs play in global governance. However, the question remains whether that expanding role has a positive impact on democratic accountability. In other words, even though polycentrism expands the scope of global democracy, the role of TNAs must be examined in greater detail.

The role, impact and limits of transnational actors

The three models of global democracy, each with different democratic principles and mechanisms, offer insights into various ways to satisfy demands for democratic accountability at the level of international institutions, while also proposing different scopes and depths of engagement with transnational actors (Archibugi et al., 2012). The theoretical shallowness of democratic confederalism reveals its lack of democratic appeal and is only nominally representative of various social strata through the state, despite its broad applicability. In contrast, federalism appears as an ideal model for democratic global governance and holds strong appeal for those advocating democratic accountability of IOs. However, even within the European Union, as one of the most integrated multilateral organizations, the federalist democratic model is implemented only partially and does not constitute the prevailing structure. Finally, polycentric democracy seems to offer the most balanced approach to increasing the democratization of IOs in the current global context, relying on the inclusion of transnational actors in diverse capacities and roles (Archibugi et al., 2012).

Figure 4: Abhi018. (2018). United Nations headquarters [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons.

To begin, it is important to define the term ‘transnational actors’ and clarify their scope and characteristics. The term TNA encompasses a broad and diverse group of actors who may be organized more structurally or loosely, may pursue their own interests or the global good, and may be profit-driven or not (Risse, 2012). Consequently, TNAs represent a highly heterogeneous group with often differing and sometimes opposing interests. Nevertheless, they share a common denominator: the use of their power, be it through resources, information, or visibility. The ultimate goal of this action is to pressure IOs or influential states to change their behavior and policies (Risse, 2012).

There are various approaches through which TNAs leverage their power to advance their goals within international organizations. Traditionally, TNAs have operated outside formal institutional structures. This includes forms of public pressure and protest aimed at influencing decisions indirectly (Risse, 2012). On the other hand, the increasing prominence of both transnational actors and international institutions have led to a more institutionalized role for TNAs. As a result, it has become more common for TNAs to gain formal access and a “seat at the table” within institutions, with varying degrees of influence by design (Tallberg et al., 2014).

These two modes of action involve different logics, benefits, and limitations. In the traditional activist approach, TNAs typically become involved when communication channels are blocked or when domestic groups cannot resolve issues with their state, employing the so-called boomerang effect (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This means TNAs bring an issue to the relevant international organization, expecting the IO to exert pressure on their government. This pattern is especially common when a government endangers certain rights of its citizens. This form of indirect action is one of the most frequent ways TNAs engage with international institutions (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, it raises numerous questions regarding the relationship between the state, domestic actors, and state sovereignty.

Figure 5: Mojnsen. (2024). United Nations General Assembly [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons.

The other mode is more functionalist in its approach to TNAs’ role in the international arena and involves bypassing the state by granting transnational actors direct access to international organizations (Tallberg et al., 2014). This mode is particularly common in policy areas such as human rights and environmental protection. It is argued that IOs and member states benefit from including TNAs specialized in particular areas without significant loss of control within the organization. Human rights issues, for instance, often require local knowledge and involvement (Tallberg et al., 2014). Including TNAs already active in these areas helps reduce costs for IOs. These TNAs participate in informing the IO, formulating policy, and assisting in implementation (Tallberg et al., 2014).

Despite TNAs’ growing roles through direct or indirect pressure on international actors, there are significant critiques and limitations regarding their contribution to democratizing international organizations. While some view TNAs as embodiments of norms established by a post-Cold War liberal world order, thus assigning them a positive role (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), others challenge this inherently optimistic perspective on the nature of TNAs within international relations and institutions (Cooley & Ron, 2002).

A critical distinction must be made between non-profit TNAs, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and for-profit multinational corporations (MNCs). Powerful MNCs can considerably influence government policymaking, often with wide-ranging consequences such as domestic job losses due to outsourcing (Risse, 2013). Moreover, MNCs’ lobbying potential surpasses that of non-profit NGOs because of their financial resources and influence, which is particularly pronounced in institutions like the IMF or the EU, both designed in ways that tend to favor the business sector and a neoliberal economic model (Risse, 2013). Consequently, democratization and greater inclusion in international decision-making are not necessarily priorities for MNCs, whose interests may conflict with those of the broader public.

Figure 6: UN Photo. (1947). Birth of a United Nations document [Photograph]. Flickr

The favorable perception of non-profit TNAs is understandable given the altruistic goals they nominally pursue. However, the proliferation and increasing prominence of non-profit NGOs have become intertwined with neoliberal marketization. This environment fosters uncertainty and competition that often drive organizational behavior (Cooley & Ron, 2002). This dynamic can seriously undermine the stated objectives, legitimacy, and normative value of these transnational actors.

On-the-ground consequences of this development include dysfunctional outcomes and excessive competition, which distort NGOs’ effectiveness in cooperation with international organizations. A pertinent example is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where post-war reconstruction brought significant funding, where post-war reconstruction efforts were accompanied by substantial inflows of international aid into the country (Devine, 2011). During this phase, “NGO representatives, under pressure to win contracts, had to forge deals with [local politicians] in order to stand a chance of winning” (Devine, 2011, p. 4).

This case supports the argument that the nominally positive role of NGOs is often overstated due to dysfunctional competition driven by the systemic nature of the market economy, which can lead to compromised and unethical practices.

Conclusion

Global democracy remains a contested and evolving idea. While the prevailing confederal model upholds state sovereignty, it fails to meet the normative standards of democratic legitimacy. Federalism, though desirable in theory, remains far from institutional reality. Democratic polycentrism offers a more plausible path forward, emphasizing the inclusion of TNAs as a means of expanding representation and enhancing accountability.

Yet inclusion is not inherently democratic. It must be structured in ways that guard against elite capture, resource-driven competition, and performative participation. Moreover, distinctions between for-profit and not-for-profit actors are essential to prevent corporate interests from dominating the space of global civil society. Therefore, while the structured and critical inclusion of TNAs holds the greatest promise for democratizing international institutions and rethinking global governance beyond the confines of state sovereignty, it comes with a fair share of shortcomings.

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Visual References