Between Stability and Stagnation: Consociationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

According to the latest report by ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), one in eight people is exposed to some form of political violence, and the number of conflicts has doubled in the last five years. In most of these cases, ethnic or religious identity is one of the contributing factors. This trend underscores the recurrence of conflicts in places with deeply entrenched divisions. It also highlights the necessity of envisioning democratic and institutional arrangements capable of managing ethnic and religious conflicts in diverse and heterogeneous societies.

The most influential approach to such societies has been shaped by the seminal works The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (1968) and Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (1977), authored by Arend Lijphart, one of the most prominent political scientists of the 20th century. The foundation of Lijphart’s consociationalist approach lies in providing a democratic solution for heterogeneous and divided societies by adapting institutional arrangements to accommodate those divisions and guarantee representation and veto powers (Stroschein, 2014). The rationale behind recognizing division and constructing an institutional framework that reflects those divisions stems from the need for stability and the acceptance of realistic political dynamics on the ground (Wilson, 2020). This article aims to present and disseminate arguments both for and against consociationalism, as well as to explore the limitations of its application in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Figure 1: Signing the Dayton Peace Agreement. Get Archive.

What is consociationalism?

John Stuart Mill, one of the most influential liberal thinkers and political philosophers, is considered a forefather of liberal democracy. Yet, Mill too was skeptical of the viability of functional democratic institutional arrangements in heterogeneous, multi-ethnic societies (Wolff & Cordell, 2016). Ever since, both in practical and theoretical terms, scholars and practitioners have been occupied with envisioning systems that could offer a democratic perspective in divided and conflict-ridden societies (Selway & Templeman, 2011). These efforts have produced a number of theories, the most prominent of which is consociational democracy (Wolff & Cordell, 2016). Indeed, even in real-world applications, consociationalist logic underpinned some of the successful conflict resolutions in the 1990s, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stroschein, 2014).

Notably, the idea of consociational democracy was initially derived from observing existing democracies. One conclusion from these observations was that most democratic societies are relatively homogeneous in religion, language, and other cultural features. These commonalities, in turn, contribute to systemic stability (Wolff & Cordell, 2016). Another insight was the existence of countries that lack such homogeneity yet remain stable democracies, such as Belgium and Switzerland. The source of this stability was found in political elites who consciously enacted forms of power sharing, characterized by four key features: grand coalitions involving representatives from different segments of society, segmental autonomy, particularly in cultural matters, proportionality in public institutions, and minority veto powers (Wolff & Cordell, 2016). By implementing these elements, heterogeneous societies have managed to remain stable and maintain legitimacy across societal divisions.

Figure 2: Good Friday Agreement Signatories (2018) by Titanic Belfast. Wikimedia Commons.

In a multi-ethnic society where one ethnic group holds a clear majority, minority groups are likely to be excluded from power indefinitely (Selway & Templeman, 2011). This long-term exclusion would undermine the legitimacy of the political system and make it prone to instability. Therefore, proportionality and minority veto are central to the success of consociationalism. However, the success and consistent implementation of these power-sharing mechanisms depends on the strength and design of institutions (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Therefore, the institutionalization of power-sharing, from constitutional design to procedural regulations, is a sine qua non of consociationalism.

Given the central role of institutions, consociational scholars advocate for power-sharing logic to be embedded across all spheres of democratic design, particularly in the electoral system, regime type, and the decentralization of authority (Selway & Templeman, 2011). In electoral terms, the proportional representation system is the natural choice, as it discourages majoritarian dominance and promotes proportionality. Similarly, a parliamentary system is preferred over a presidential one, as it more effectively ensures the inclusion of all ethnic or religious groups in decision-making processes (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Finally, federalism, as a form of decentralization, is another feature compatible with consociational logic. However, unlike the first two dimensions, federalism is not an absolute prerequisite for consociational arrangements (Selway & Templeman, 2011).

Figure 3: The New Iraqi Constitution Conference (2005). Wikimedia Commons.

Against consociationalism

Not everyone views consociationalism and its logic as the most valuable approach to envisioning democratic systems in diverse and heterogeneous countries. A number of counterarguments point to weaknesses and limitations in the strict application of power-sharing mechanisms.

One ontological assumption of consociationalism is the presupposition of geographical concentration—that is, the idea that stability depends on a clear majority of one group residing in a particular area. In other words, consociationalist scholars have long assumed a linear relationship between diversity and instability (Wilson, 2020). However, empirical evidence suggests a more complex reality regarding how different ethnic groups move, interact, and coexist (Wilson, 2020). Thus, instability and conflict are not necessarily predetermined by increased ethnic diversity.

Beyond abstract theoretical claims, the consociationalist argument for proportional representation electoral systems and parliamentarism also warrants scrutiny. While the proportional representation system provides broad representation, it carries drawbacks such as political paralysis, entrenched ethnic voting patterns, and the potential for extremist fringe parties to gain visibility (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Similarly, scholars have expressed skepticism regarding the presumed benefits of parliamentarism over presidentialism in power-sharing contexts, arguing that in many cases, presidential arrangements have provided greater stability (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Nevertheless, presidentialism is also critiqued for its potential to further entrench divisions, thereby endangering long-term political stability (Selway & Templeman, 2011).

Figure 4: President Clinton addressing the Croat-Muslim Federation Peace Agreement signing ceremony (1994) by CIA. Flickr.'

A particularly salient critique against consociationalist power-sharing arises from its practical track record. While consociational logic was originally derived from the observation of already stable democracies like Belgium and Switzerland, it has since been applied to more violent, post-war contexts, most prominently Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Iraq (Wolff & Cordell, 2016). Despite its early success and prominent position in political science, “recent studies have found limited support for consociational expectations that greater minority representation leads to greater support for democracy” (Reilly, 2012, p. 262). Therefore, the second part of this article will focus on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a notable example of consociationalism, in order to assess its empirical record in fostering long-term democratic stability.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Background

Before embarking on an analysis of consociational institutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to provide a brief background on the formation of the contemporary state (B&H). While B&H has a long history as an entity in the Balkans, it was mostly ruled by various foreign powers, most notably the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. During this period, B&H became an ethnically diverse society, with Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks (formerly referred to as Muslims) emerging as the three main ethnic groups (Fejzić, 2023). However, contrary to popular belief, internal conflict along ethnic lines is a relatively recent phenomenon (Rašidagić, 2021).

Modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its current borders and socio-political form, originated as a federal unit within the Socialist Yugoslavia. During this time, B&H was often described as the embodiment of the popular slogan “brotherhood and unity,” and as a microcosm of the broader Yugoslav experience (Rašidagić, 2021). This also meant that the issues which contributed to the eventual breakup of Yugoslavia, particularly ethnic tensions and conflict, remained deeply embedded in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Baker, 2015). Moreover, experiences with power-sharing and minority vetoes were already present in both B&H and Yugoslavia during the post-WWII period. Despite being under a one-party communist regime, quotas and ethnically proportional ethnic representation were inherent features of the Bosnian political system before the war (Fejzić, 2023).

Figure 5: Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Wikimedia Commons.

Therefore, while the roots of the violent conflict from 1992 to 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina lie in the broader context of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the influence of external pressures from Serbia and Croatia, the conflict primarily unfolded along the ethnic lines primarily (Baker, 2015). As a result, the resolution of this predominantly ethnic conflict came in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, brokered by the US administration, the settlement was once again founded on the premise of ethnic group representation (Fejzić, 2023). The Dayton Peace Agreement transformed Bosnia and Herzegovina into a de facto federal state composed of two entities—one of which (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) also operates under a federal arrangement. The agreement included a number of provisions designed to ensure equal ethnic representation among the three main groups (Rašidagić, 2021).

The Dayton Peace Agreement was not only a war-ending settlement, but it also introduced a constitutional framework for post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, laid out in Annex 4, which remains the country’s de facto constitution (Rašidagić, 2021). This constitution is arguably the most comprehensive practical application of consociational logic, guaranteeing proportional representation, providing each ethnic group with a seat at every political table, and institutionalizing power-sharing (Stroschein, 2014). In practice, this means that political elites from each ethnic group are compelled to cooperate, with the institutional design ensuring mutual incentives for collaboration. However, while the consociational arrangement of Bosnian institutions partially aligns in theory and to a certain extent in practice, there are numerous practical issues that seriously undermine the long-term viability of the state itself.

Figure 6: Sarajevo, 1996. Picryl.

Limits of consociationalism

The consociational nature of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) has succeeded in achieving a lasting and stable peace, with no recurring patterns of inter-ethnic violence (Baker, 2015). Nevertheless, while even critics acknowledge this achievement, they emphasize that the long-term viability of such an arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina faces serious challenges to long-term sustainability (Fejzić, 2023).

The problems facing Bosnia and Herzegovina are multifaceted. To begin with, many of these challenges align with the previously mentioned theoretical critiques of consociationalism. For instance, democratic deficits are evident throughout the political system. The central source of political legitimacy in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the three main ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, whose political dominance and representation are closely tied to the geographic areas where they form the majority. This structure limits the democratic participation of: a) individuals who belong to other minority groups, such as Jews and Roma, or those who identify as Bosnian in a supra-ethnic sense, and b) members of a main ethnic group who reside outside their group’s dominant geographic area—for example, Bosniaks living in predominantly Croatian areas, or vice versa (Stroschein, 2014).

This inherent consequence is further compounded by a fundamental side-effect of consociationalism. As previously discussed, consociationalism rests on the principle of equal representation among ethnic groups (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Consequently, political representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily occurs along ethnic lines. While this approach may help preserve peace in the short term, it also reinforces ethnic divisions over time. Indeed, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles with a unified identification with the state, especially within Serbian and Croatian constituencies, which has led to the development of three increasingly distinct cultural spheres (Fejzić, 2023). Census data further indicates that the country’s ethnic groups are becoming more geographically concentrated and homogenous, undermining prospects for genuine multi-ethnic coexistence (Statistika.ba).

Figure 7: The ethnic map (by municipality) of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the 2013 population census by Vedib. Wikimedia Commons.

Finally, at the level of practical and procedural democratic functioning, B&H is consistently plagued by political stalemates and stagnation on its Euro-Atlantic integration path (Stroschein, 2014). This dysfunction is exacerbated by an overdependence on the so-called international community, whose role is enshrined in the Dayton Peace Agreement. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a de facto international protectorate with limited autonomy (Stroschein, 2014). Political elites frequently rely on international representatives to resolve complex issues, which makes it increasingly difficult to reduce external involvement (Baker, 2015). When coupled with the aforementioned polarization, both cultural and geographic, it becomes evident that consociationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while successful in ending violence, has failed to provide a viable and sustainable long-term solution for a deeply divided society.

Conclusion

In sum, consociationalism has offered a prominent framework for addressing political instability in ethnically divided societies by emphasizing inclusive governance, proportional representation, and institutionalized power-sharing. As demonstrated, this model was central to ending violent conflict and establishing a framework for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, the case of B&H also exposes the inherent limitations of consociational arrangements when applied in post-conflict, deeply divided contexts. While peace has endured, the rigid institutionalization of ethnic identities, persistent democratic deficits, and chronic political deadlock have undermined the state’s capacity for long-term cohesion and development. 

These challenges raise important questions about the sustainability of consociationalism as a long-term democratic solution for heterogeneous societies. Ultimately, while consociationalism may serve as a conflict management tool, its ability to foster genuine democratic integration and long-term stability remains contested, particularly when the political system reinforces, rather than transcends, the very divisions it seeks to accommodate.

Bibliographical References

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. (2025, February 17). ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data). https://acleddata.com/

Baker, C. (2015). The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-39899-4

Fejzić, E. (2023). Contemporary politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Historical determinants and political experiences. Eurasian Research Journal, 5(2), 49–60. https://doi.org/10.53277/2519-2442-2023.2-04

Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (n.d.). 2013 census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.statistika.ba/

Rašidagić, E. K. (2021). Modern political history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Studies Journal for Research of Bosnian Thought and Culture, 20–39. https://doi.org/10.47999/bos.2021.5.1.20-39

Reilly, B. (2012). Institutional designs for diverse democracies: Consociationalism, centripetalism and communalism compared. European Political Science, 11(2), 259–270. https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2011.36

Selway, J., & Templeman, K. (2011). The myth of consociationalism? Conflict reduction in divided societies. Comparative Political Studies, 45(12), 1542–1571. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011425341

Stroschein, S. (2014). Consociational settlements and reconstruction. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 656(1), 97–115. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214544459

Wilson, M. C. (2020). A closer look at the limits of consociationalism. Comparative Political Studies, 53(5), 700–733. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858956

Wolff, S., & Cordell, K. (2016). Consociationalism. In K. Cordell & S. Wolff (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict (2nd ed., pp. 289–299). Routledge.

Visual References

Cover Image

Affan Ramić. (n.d.). Bridge over the River Neretva [Painting]. Spirit of Bosnia. https://www.spiritofbosnia.org/volume-19-no-2-2024-april/30-bosnian-artists/

(Public domain / image used for illustrative purposes.)

Figure 1

GetArchive.net. (n.d.). Signing the Dayton Peace Agreement [Photograph]. https://itoldya420.getarchive.net/amp/media/signing-the-dayton-agreement-milosevic-tudjman-izetbegovic-053149

(Presumed public domain; U.S. government image.)

Figure 2

Titanic Belfast. (2018). Good Friday Agreement signatories [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Visits-GOOD_FRIDAY_AGREEMENT_SIGNATORIES_ADDRESS_CO-OPERATION_IRELAND_EVENT_%2843270423005%29.jpg

(CC BY-SA 4.0)

Figure 3

Wikimedia Commons. (2005). The New Iraqi Constitution Conference [Photograph]. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iraq_Federalism_Conference_Nov.2005.JPG

(Public domain or CC license, depending on contributor.)

Figure 4

Central Intelligence Agency. (1994). President Clinton addressing the Croat-Muslim Federation Peace Agreement signing ceremony [Photograph]. Flickr. https://www.flickr.com/photos/ciagov/9779288222/in/photostream/

(Public domain – U.S. federal government work.)

Figure 5

Wikimedia Commons. (2008). Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Map]. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Former_Yugoslavia_2008.PNG

(CC BY-SA 3.0)

Figure 6

Picryl. (1996). Sarajevo, 1996 [Photograph]. https://picryl.com/media/sarajevo-1931996-war-4132f8

(Public domain – Picryl aggregates content from U.S. government and open archives.)

Figure 7

Vedib. (2013). The ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina by municipality (2013 census) [Map]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_Ethnic_map.png(CC BY-SA 4.0)