Does Evolution Explain Psychological Sex Differences?

Evolutionary Psychology (hereafter, ‘EP’) results from the widely accepted premise that Homo sapiens have evolved by way of Darwinian mechanisms (Green, 1995). The view holds that both the mental lives and behaviour of humans reflect the evolutionary history of the species, thus supposedly explaining the psychological differences between men and women too (Green, 1995). Of course, history is often capable of explaining the present, rather like in a chain of events. The article acknowledges that EP is justified here, especially since the parts of the mind that deal with decision-making were formed when humans experienced pressure to survive and reproduce. Nowadays, this can certainly influence us to jealously guard romantic partners and cherish our closest relatives above all others, lest we fail to pass on our genes (Confer et al., 2010). However, for both pragmatic and epistemic reasons, this feature will demonstrate that the main—if not, the—problem with EP is that it grounds absolutely all human characteristics on Darwinian evolution, including differences in mental functions and behaviours of the sexes based purely on biological adaptations (Confer et al., 2010). This excludes the essential developmental, social, and cultural factors that contribute to one’s psychology regardless of evolution and has potentially detrimental impacts on gender equality as a result. Hence, it is undeniably problematic to hold the view that evolution alone explains psychological sex differences. The main aim of this article is therefore to show how and why each domain—not just EP—has a contribution to make to the study of psychological sex differences.

The article focuses primarily on David Buss’ account of EP. Buss (2003), a prominent evolutionary psychologist in the field, claims that men and women have evolved distinct psychological mechanisms that underlie short-term and long-term mating strategies. He even asserts that evolution is the only theory capable of explaining human psychology and therefore psychological sex differences (Buss, 2003). This view indeed grounds human behaviour (oftentimes ‘mating behaviour') merely in the evolutionary imperative to produce as many viable offspring as possible (Ruti, 2015). Not only is this imprudent, but it also pays very little—or no—attention to gender similarities. Hence, this essay seeks to show that there is instead also compelling evidence from theories that do not stem from solely an evolutionary perspective (including those which point out notable similarities between men and women). Such theories should be taken into account too, this feature argues. The EP view is first outlined and introduced, including Buss’ account specifically. Buss’ (2003) own explanation of sex differences, based on evolution alone, is then addressed. The article goes on to provide objections to such a view and finally discusses other available theories of human psychology and sex differences. In sum, the goal is to illustrate how and why the Theory of Evolution is not the only viable explanation on offer for the differences between male and female behaviour. Before the article gets going, it is first important to note that it acknowledges that there is much dispute in psychology as to whether differences in men and women should be called ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ differences (and this generally depends on the psychologist who is using it, often subject to time). As such, whilst this piece acknowledges conflicting use of terminology, it uses the terms interchangeably since it is referring to different psychologists' views throughout.

Figure 1. Evolutionary Psychologist David Buss (2011).

Evolutionary Psychology

EP, roughly speaking, postulates that the mind was shaped by pressure to survive and reproduce (Kenrick, 2001). It is an approach to psychology in which knowledge and principle from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of the human mind (Buller, 2005). At the base of the thesis is Charles Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution by natural selection. Whilst the basis on Darwinian evolution remains, different evolutionary psychologists now argue that the mind has been shaped by pressure to survive and reproduce not exclusively but to varying degrees (Confer et al., 2010). Two caveats are thus in order, firstly that this article is not suggesting that all evolutionary psychologists are guilty of the kind of overgeneralised arguments criticised here, and secondly that such criticism is not opposing Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution by natural selection. Notably, any protest to EP, therefore, does not result from Darwin’s discoveries. Alternatively, the objective is to show that (i) evolution does have a say in explaining human behaviour, but (ii) it is not the only narrative.

Human behaviour—regardless of the weight of evolution—is shaped by factors of the time, yet proponents of EP often claim that both evolutionary history and biology can account for everything there is to know about human psychology (Green, 1995). Certain proponents of the theory further hold that it is simply the best and only theory to fully explain human psychology today. The obstacles are thus insurmountable regarding evolutionary psychological attempts to account for gender and sexuality specifically (Ruti, 2015). This indeed provides the main epistemic reason motivating the argument that EP is not the only narrative for understanding human psychology and sex differences, not to mention the dangerous (oftentimes sexist) consequences which are the pragmatic reasoning used throughout the essay.

Figure 2. Charles Darwin, whose scientific theory of evolution by natural selection became the foundation of modern evolutionary studies (Desmond, 2023).

The evolutionary paradigm’s central proposition driving EP is the so-called maximisation or optimisation principle: the idea that individuals tend to behave so as to optimise their inclusive fitness, namely, the relative genetic contribution by themselves and their blood relatives to future generations (Green, 1995). This proposition refers to natural selection, central to Darwin’s (1859) theory. Darwin found that organisms more adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and pass on the genes that aided their success, causing species to change and diverge over time (Osterloff, 2021). As defined by Darwin, this is the preservation of favourable variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious (Darwin and Beer, 1859).

As Penny Green (1995) notes, evolutionary psychologists, therefore, claim that humans tend to pursue broad classes of behaviour that were adaptive during their ancient past, and which may still be so today. Most importantly, relying on this logic does not require that individuals be consciously motivated to enhance their genetic fitness; it predicts simply that they will typically behave as if so motivated (i.e., as if by instinct but relative to today). Human behaviours today simply reflect an evolutionary past. This is all well at face value, but it is worth noting that evolutionary psychologists like Steven Pinker (2006) then go on to make the assertion that “in the study of humans, there are major spheres of human experience – beauty, motherhood, kinship, morality, cooperation, sexuality, violence – in which evolutionary psychology provides the only coherent theory” (p.3).

Figure 3. Canadian-American cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker, advocate of Evolutionary Psychology (Pallardy and Hollar, 2023).

David Buss’ Account of Evolutionary Psychology

Buss (2013) endorses a view like Pinker’s above, that EP provides the only sound explanation of male and female psychology (and the differences between the two). Buss (2013) even declares that EP is a scientific discipline, capable of answering the following questions:

1. Why is the mind designed the way it is – what causal processes created, fashioned, or shaped the human mind into its current form?

2. How is the human mind designed – what are its mechanisms or component parts, and how are they organised?

3. What are the functions of the component parts and their organised structure (i.e., what is the mind designed to do?)

4. How does input from the current environment interact with the design of the human mind to produce observable behaviour?

The idea that certain human behaviour reflects an evolutionary past is uncontroversial. Behaviours such as eating, avoiding danger, and the pursuit of sex for example are indeed a product of evolution (Kenrick, 2001). Additionally, the ‘design’ of minds is technically shaped by evolution, leading one to draw parallels between historical and current decision-making. The statement that EP can explain all there is to know about human psychology (and reasons for gender differences), however, is a little far-fetched. The presumption that EP alone can provide the truth about human psychology simply ignores the other essential domains that provide important accounts for the major spheres of human experience and characteristics (Green, 1995), and it is questionable as to how EP can supposedly answer Question 4—noting the input from the current environment—yet avoid a multi-disciplinary approach. Moreover, this is all based on EP qualifying as a scientific discipline in its own right. Buss (2013) therefore leaps from Darwinian evolution to a new ‘psychological science’ which he claims is a revolution in the field since it can include a modern understanding of genes (discussed next). According to Buss (2013), not only is EP a science, but it is therefore also the miraculous key to unlocking answers to the most mysterious questions that have puzzled ancient Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle who wrote manifestos on the subject. Not to mention, EP is thus capable of answering the kinds of questions that have baffled scientists, psychologists, and researchers ever since.

Buss’ particular account of EP is quite bold, especially when he utilises William Hamilton’s (1964) findings that natural selection favours characteristics that cause an organism’s genes to be passed on, regardless of whether the organism produces offspring directly (Buss, 2013). This revolutionises evolutionary thinking, Buss (2013) argues, with a new era known as gene’s eye thinking. The key point is not that genes are conscious or able to think, but that the gene is the fundamental unit of inheritance, the most important kind of unit passed on from one generation to another (Hamilton, 1964). For the evolutionary psychologist, this directly influences human behaviour. As Buss (2013) notes, this perspective and particular research on the gene was unknown in Darwinian times but is the kind of thinking that has profound consequences for how we think about the psychology of the family, altruism, helping, the formation of groups, and even aggression.

Figure 4. Evolutionary biologist J. Arvid Ågren (2021), author of The Gene's-Eye View of Evolution.

David Buss’ (2013) findings here, importantly, should not be confused with evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology, the subfield of biology that studies the evolutionary processes that produced the diversity of life on Earth, is well-confirmed and supported by overwhelming evidence (Kenrick, 2001). Hence, it is not synonymous with Buss’ argument. Alternatively, Buss (2013) and other evolutionary psychologists make far-fetched observations of behaviour in a single species when they infer an evolutionary history from a single data point, merely drawing evolutionary conclusions from the simple existence of a trait in a population. The next step, which is isolating the genetic core of a behaviour from the learned properties of an organism is even more unfeasible, and genetic determinism (the belief that genes determine human behaviour) has minimal evidence (Green, 1995). As Paul Meyers (2013) notes, it is seriously difficult to separate learned behaviour from genetically predisposed behaviour, yet evolutionary psychologists seem to do this all the time. Meyers (2013) even alleges that the huge step of linking behaviour to genes to evolution demands data and methods that are not present in the toolbox, making most of the claims of evolutionary psychologists fallacious. Despite this, evolutionary psychologists tout their theory as scientific research, and in Buss’ case, as a science in and by itself. Buss (2013) indeed uses EP to differentiate between male and female psychology too, as explored next.

Psychological Sex Differences on David Buss’ Account

According to Buss’ (2013) theory, men and women differ in domains in which they have faced different adaptive problems over human evolutionary theory. Interestingly, these sorts of adaptive-related problems nearly always refer to sexual selection, as this piece goes on to discuss. Other than the domains in which men and women faced these distinct adaptive problems, the sexes are predicted to be psychologically similar in all other domains (Green, 1995). Hereafter, the article argues that the specific focus on sexual selection—to explain psychological sex differences—is distorted. Clear-cut ‘sex differences’ based purely on evolution are seriously problematic, especially in striving for gender equality. This general idea embedded in Buss’ (2013) theory also encourages and exacerbates the widespread belief that men and women are adapted to different roles. One must consider Buss’ reasoning first, however, as this section explores.

Figure 5. An illustration to represent societal gender stereotypes reversed (Sweet, 2012).

Going from the different adaptive problems faced by men and women to the claim that men and women are psychologically distinct in those domains (Buss, 2013) is a complicated leap, particularly in modern society. Further, this argument nearly always results from Darwinian sexual selection. At the core of their ideology, evolutionary psychologists therefore repeatedly make the questionable inference that sex differences must only be explained by the evolutionary imperative to reproduce successfully (Green, 1995). Hence, EP in this sense seems to promote the dangerous but widespread conviction that men and women live in vastly different psychological, emotional, and sexual universes (Ruti, 2015). Gender stereotypes have a kind of scientific ‘stamp of approval’ from EP here.

Buss and fellow evolutionary psychologist David Schmitt (1993), for instance, explain that there are ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ mating strategies for men and women, largely responsible for broad sex differences they claim. These strategies are evident in evolutionary history, since humans faced different adaptive problems in such distinct mating strategies. The problems for men and women are set out below (Buss and Schmitt, 1993):

In short-term mating, men faced problems of:

1. Partner number;

2. Identifying which women are sexually accessible;

3. Minimising cost, risk, and commitment.

Then, in long-term mating, the problems of:

1. Paternity confidence;

2. Female reproductive value;

3. Commitment;

4. Gene quality.

On the other hand, women pursuing short-term mating faced problems such as:

1. Immediate resource extraction;

2. Evaluating short-term mates as possible long-term mates;

3. Mate switching, mate expulsion, or mate backup.

Finally, in long-term mating, women faced problems like:

1. Identifying men who are willing to invest;

2. Physical protection;

3. Commitment;

4. Good parenting skills;

5. Gene quality.

In summary, Buss and Schmitt (1993) are proposing that the adaptive problems men and women faced explain adaptive strategies subsequently adopted. At face value, whether one likes it or not, it is difficult to disagree with. It is true that both sexes engage in both ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ mating, and this might result in different problems for each sex. Short-term mating has been given various (more discrete) names today – brief affairs, one-night stands, or temporary liaisons, for example. Men and women face different problems with such events, even today. For instance, whilst men historically have been more concerned with seeking out women primarily for sex (‘identifying women who are sexually accessible’), women tend to seek out men who they can be with long-term (‘evaluation of short-term mates as possible long-term mates’). To some extent, this is still true today. Indeed, ‘long-term’ mating nowadays might refer to long-term relationships or marriage, which undeniably comes with various (different) issues for men and women.

Figure 6. According to Darwin, sexual selection may account for 'secondary sexual characteristics', such as a Peacock's elaborate physical markings (Deppe, 2012).

However, problems ensue when claims about sex differences are made based on an evolutionary past only, excluding other important contributions to human psychology today. A multi-disciplinary approach is often of great worth, and in this case may (i) look beyond sexual selection only, and (ii) account for the fact that the specific problems related to short and long-term mating are not just based on being male or female (Green, 1995). All in all, though humans' evolutionary past can add a lot to one’s understanding of sex differences, this theory of gradual change and development of the species cannot account for absolutely everything.

Objections to David Buss

At a surface level, there are no issues with the view that there are differences—biological or psychological—between men and women. This article, by and large, is not claiming that this is a problem. Nor should ‘different’ imply ‘unequal’. Claiming that there are sex differences and using sexual selection only to explain this, however, becomes dangerous and inaccurate (especially considering the conclusions that evolutionary psychologists draw). In particular, the conclusions that involve rape are sexist and inappropriate.

Figure 7. Male and female skeletons, exhibiting sexual dimorphism (FPFW, 2017).

To give an example, the famous author Robert Wright (1996), who is also a supporter of EP in his popular classic The Moral Animal, claims that “a female, in sheerly Darwinian terms, is better off mating with a good rapist, a big, strong, sexually aggressive male; her male offspring will then be more likely to be big, strong, and sexually aggressive...so female resistance should be favoured by natural selection as a way to avoid having a son who is an inept rapist (assuming it doesn’t bring injury to the female)” (p.307). Wright is claiming here that this is the case with orangutans specifically, but later asserts that the same logic can be applied to other primates, including humans (Wright, 1996). Essentially, Wright is explaining the psychological sex differences in men and women, and why, evolutionary speaking, this is the case. Hence, he claims it is advantageous for women to put up some sexual resistance since this can ensure that women are mating with males who have the so-called “good rapist” genes (Wax and Wright 1996, p307.). The difference is that men are more aggressive while women are the submissive sex, but this serves an important reproductive (evolutionary) purpose.

Rape is often mentioned in EP with a shockingly cavalier attitude. It is mentioned a lot with regard to sex differences. Buss (2003), for instance, confirms that there are potentially evolutionary advantages to rape, such as increased pregnancy rates. Buss (2003) cites a study that “discovered that pregnancy rates resulting from penile-vaginal rape among reproductive-age women are extraordinarily high – 6.42% compared to a consensual per-incident rate of only 3.1%” (p.37). He goes on to state that this “can be partially explained by selection bias in the victims whom rapists target – young fertile women” (Buss 2003, p.38.). Buss is therefore drawing similarities between rape and mating success. The evolutionary psychologist indeed refers to another study that finds men who have many sexual partners also score high on sexual aggression (Buss, 2003). Not only does this ignore the ways in which rape is a sexual assault crime, but this is what drives Buss’ view that men and women differ psychologically with regard to long-term and short-term mating specifically. This is reflected in his astonishing assertion that “these sex differences suggest that women are the more selective or discriminating sex with respect to mating partners, whereas men are less discriminating and more vigorous in intrasexual competition for mates” (Buss, 2003). On many levels, it is outrageous to research the reproductive benefits of rape. Buss’ (2003) claim, that this can inform us that men can be more sexually aggressive because of the mating success associated with rape, is extremist.

Figure 8. Randy Thornhill, co-author of A Natural History of Rape which argues that evolutionary psychology can account for rape among human beings but then help make proposals for preventing rape (Desfilis, 2013).

Before continuing, it is important to note that the right research on gender differences is particularly important due to the stereotypes about psychological gender differences abound that massively influence people’s behaviour (Green, 1995). One must therefore investigate whether claimed sex differences, such as Buss’, are accurate (Hyde, 2014). As mentioned, any link drawn between mating success and rape—to suggest that women are the more selective or discriminating sex—is outrageous. It also appears to be lacking in value neutrality, leading one to ask why it is at all important to conduct research into the ‘reproductive benefits’ of rape in the first place. Worryingly, the extraordinary statements made by evolutionary psychologists are often justified with EP’s scientific background and basis. Wright (1996), for example, professes that “what natural selection ‘wants’ and what any individual wants needn’t be the same” (p.307). By objecting to EP, one can easily be regarded as ‘unscientific’. Thus, evolutionary psychologists are perhaps guilty of touting their theory as a science which may justify unnecessary research and statements.

In reality, evidence is mixed as to whether evolution can explain sex differences. For example, the conflicting results regarding the desired number of sexual partners for men and women. Buss and Schmitt (1993), who based their research on short-term and long-term mating strategies, predicted large gender differences in the desired number of sexual partners, for instance. Their study found that men, on average and in a 30 year time-frame, desire 30 partners. This is compared with women’s desire for 4. Such a prediction, however, was only consistent with evolutionary theories. This is precisely the issue, since according to evolution, men are found to increase their fitness by having sex with numerous women. Another team, for instance, collected similar data and reached very different conclusions (Pedersen et al. 2002). Even though they found men desiring more partners than women, the distributions were highly skewed, with a few individuals wanting hundreds of partners – the mean was not an appropriate statistic. The researchers focused on the median, which for both men and women was one partner (Hyde, 2014). Hence, the sex differences in Buss and Schmitt’s account are inaccurate and are inconsistent with anything other than evolution because of the narrow evolutionary perspective, which they deem is the only perspective.

Figure 9. Personality psychologist David Schmitt (2005), also founder of the International Sexuality Description Project.

Other Theories Available for Explaining Sex Differences

Each domain has a contribution to make to our overall understanding of human psychology (Ruti, 2015). Instead of deciding between ‘nature’ (i.e., EP) or ‘nurture’, the study of psychological gender differences should include theories incorporating both notions. EP has a say, but so do other approaches such as Cognitive Social Learning Theory, Sociocultural Theory, or Expectancy-Value Theory (Hyde, 2014). Indeed, the other named theories are arguably better suited to account for gender differences, but a multi-disciplinary approach is preferable for reasons this article shall now consider.

Firstly, Cognitive Social Learning Theory has a much broader utility in this kind of understanding, and abundant evidence supports the general idea in the theory that both children’s and adults’ behaviour is shaped by reinforcements and punishments (Nabavi, 2012). Further, people imitate or model others in their environment, particularly if the others are powerful or admirable (Hyde, 2014). The cognitive elements that were added in the more recent versions of the theory are the parts accounting for gender differences. For instance, the theory holds that, as children grow, control of their behaviour shifts from externally imposed reinforcements and punishments to internalised standards and self-regulation (Hyde, 2014). Children thus internalise gender norms and conform their behaviour to those norms (Hyde, 2014). This is unlike anything EP suggests, yet it has increasing evidence in support.

Figure 10. Albert Bandura's social learning theory suggests that observation and modelling play a primary role in how and why people learn (Bekker, 2014).

More specifically, there is the Sociocultural Theory available by Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood (1999), proposed as an alternative to evolutionary theorising about gender differences. Instead of such differences explained merely by sexual selection, including the conclusions reached about rape, the Sociocultural Theory holds that, because of male-female differences in strength and childbearing, a division of labour by gender arose which created psychological gender differences (Hyde, 2014). This is to say that a society’s division of labour by gender essentially drives all other psychological gender differences. Although recent, this theory is gathering increasing support, especially since Eagly and Wood (1999) reanalysed much of what Buss had originally hypothesised regarding evolution’s influence on sex differences. For instance, Buss’ (2013) cross-national data on gender differences in mate preferences and long-term/short-term mating strategies. Rather Eagly and Wood (1999) found strong correlations between gender inequality and the magnitude of gender differences in mate preferences. So, using a United Nations database, they found that the nations with the largest gender gaps in power also have the largest gender gaps in mate preferences (Eagly and Wood, 1999). Importantly, such findings are consistent with the Sociocultural Theory but are completely inconsistent with EP. Evidence, however, is accumulating in support of the former said theory (Hyde, 2014), suggesting another reason why EP cannot provide the only coherent theory to the study of psychological gender differences as Pinker (2006) once stated.

Not only do the other available theories mentioned provide alternative reasoning for gender differences, but they also show much of what EP (and Buss in particular) says to be inconsistent with emerging data and consensus. Recent data, for example, does not necessarily fit in with the evolutionary psychological picture, and evidence is considerably more mixed than Buss (2003) and others like to claim – the statistics instead point in all sorts of directions. Put differently, no one theory can account for gender differences altogether.

Figure 11. Sociocultural-theory diagram (Main, 2023).

Concluding Discussion

This feature has not gone into great detail about what the psychological differences between males and females are. Instead, it has objected to the evolutionary psychological claim that evolution alone explains gender differences. That being so, it becomes apparent how one must not only look at an evolutionary past to investigate sex differences. When it comes to evolutionary psychological attempts to account for gender and sexuality, the obstacles are insurmountable since the reasons why men are different to women are merely grounded in a maximisation principle (Green, 1995). This is especially the case in David Buss’ (2013) problematic account.

Buss (2003) postulates that EP revolutionises what one can take from Darwinian evolution. For example, he says that our modern understanding of genes shines new light on what evolution can explain about human psychology. Before Buss proposes anything about gender differences, however, there are already issues with what the theory claims to know about genes and behaviour. For instance, some of the methods involved here are not possible yet, such as isolating the genetic core of behaviour from the learned properties of an organism (Meyers, 2013). Buss (2013) goes on to argue that men and women differ in domains in which they face different adaptive problems over evolutionary theory. Men face different problems from women in short-term and long-term mating strategies. Hence, Buss does not base psychological sex differences on evolution, but on a very specific part of this; namely sexual selection. Evolution and its promotion of reproductive success, however, cannot be the reason for psychological gender differences to exist, nor does it explain what sex differences amount to. It comes as no surprise that Buss’ (2013) account of EP is therefore completely undermined by other persuasive evidence and theories, as this article has briefly explored. For example, the evidence provided by the Sociocultural Theory or Cognitive Social Learning Theory. Each theory has increasingly clear evidence for psychological gender differences that use more than an evolutionary lens. An evolutionary narrative is not the only one capable of explaining human psychology. The article, therefore, finishes with a quote by Evolutionary Biologist Jerry Coyne (2000 p.27):

"Evolutionary psychology suffers from the scientific equivalent of megalomania. Many of its adherents are convinced that virtually every human action or feeling, including depression, homosexuality, religion, and consciousness, was put directly into our brains by natural selection. In this view, evolution becomes the key – the only key – that can unlock our humanity."

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