The Troubles in Northern Ireland represented 30 years of complex intercommunal, paramilitary and state violence that claimed the lives of thousands and saw entire generations born or raised into conflict. Yet many struggle to understand how and why such a conflict could occur so recently in such a small corner of Western Europe. This 101 series will give a broad overview of the origins and history of the Troubles, the conflicting ethno-national identities that fuelled them, and an analysis of the peace process that brought the violence to an end and what that means for Northern Ireland today.
The Troubles in Northern Ireland 101 is divided into seven different chapters:
The Troubles 101: Unionism and Loyalism - "No Surrender"
The Troubles 101: The Good Friday Agreement
The Troubles 101: Northern Ireland After Good Friday - An End to the Troubles?
Following the partition of Ireland in 1922, Unionism has come to be understood as the basic belief that Northern Ireland should remain a part of the United Kingdom – with Unionists forming a majority of the population in the Six Counties of the North. Yet Unionism has a long history that is vital to understanding attitudes toward the Republic of Ireland and Britain and how they have helped shape the Troubles. Like Irish Nationalism, Unionism is a broad umbrella term that at various times in history has incorporated different religious, political and economic groups and interests, with varying ideas of what form Ireland's constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom should take. Meanwhile Loyalism, much like Republicanism in the Nationalist context, refers to a hard-line position within Unionism, emphasising an Ulster Protestant ethnonational identity whose uncompromising Unionist attitudes are historically distinct to the North of Ireland and are vital to understanding the Loyalist violence of the Troubles.
This article will thus outline the history of Unionism in Ireland, and in particular its links to Protestantism. It will then illustrate the late Nineteenth Century birth of Ulster Loyalism as a distinct variant of Unionism in the midst of the Irish Home Rule crisis, which will serve as a basis for the next section investigating Loyalist identity, historiography and attitudes. The key Unionist and Loyalist political parties will then be presented, before also investigating the role of the British and Northern Irish states in relation to Unionism and the Troubles. The article will end with a section outlining the nature and factions of Loyalist paramilitarism.
Unionism in Ireland
The earliest incarnation of Unionism in Ireland can be dated to the first Anglo-Norman invasion in 1169, with the Anglo-Norman Lords who settled in Ireland retaining their linkages to the English Crown (Duffy, 2019). However, it was England´s Protestant Reformation that signalled the key early development in the formation of modern Unionism, with King Henry VIII breaking from the Papal authority of the Roman Catholic Church and declaring the Crown as head of the new Church of England (Gillespie, 1993). Simultaneously, following rebellions from Gaelic and ”Old English” Anglo-Norman Lords, England´s power in Ireland had been slipping away, leading Henry VIII to establish the Kingdom of Ireland in 1542 on whose throne sat the King of England, alongside a Protestant Church of Ireland, attempting to create a unified Irish state for the first time (O'Riordan, 1958). Beginning in 1556, mainly Protestant “New English” settlers began to arrive to occupy lands confiscated from rebellious Lords in Ireland (Gillespie, 1993).
By the end of the Sixteenth Century, with Scotland having undergone its own Protestant Reformation and with Wars of Religion raging right across Europe, religion was increasingly the barometer for Irish Lords to prove loyalty to the Crowns of England and Ireland – thereby establishing an early link between Protestantism and Unionism. The ascension of Scottish King James to the English throne in the 1603 ´Union of Crowns´ meant for the first time the same Monarch sat on the thrones of the Kingdoms of Scotland, England, and by extension Ireland (Ohlmeyer, 1999). Meanwhile, the defeat of a rebellion in Ireland´s northern prvince of Ulster meant from 1606 large numbers of Scottish and English Protestant settlers began to arrive in the “Ulster Plantation” (Ibid.). From 1639 religious tensions boiled over under King Charles I, sparking a bloody and complex series of civil wars in England, Scotland, and Ireland, including the massacre of thousands of Protestant settlers in Ulster that would have a lasting impact on Protestant memory (Ibid.).
Oliver Cromwell´s brutal conquest of Ireland in 1649 to eliminate the Catholic ´threat´ and secure Protestantism once and for all resulted in the deaths of some 40% of Ireland´s population, with Catholic-owned lands confiscated and Catholic practises actively repressed (Covington, 2013). The 1689 victory of Protestant King William over Catholic King James in the Irish “Williamite War” finally secured Protestant rule of the Anglo-Irish Landlords under the “Protestant Ascendancy” (Murtagh, 1993). This was enforced by Penal Laws barring Catholics from inheriting land or holding public office, with Non-Conformist Protestants also barred from the latter: such legal systems firmly established the link between loyalty to the State, adoption of the Anglican Church, and the holding of political-economic power (Cullen, 1986). Meanwhile, Protestant settlers, particularly Scottish Presbyterians, had arrived en masse to form the majority Ulster population by 1720.
The “Protestant Ascendancy” thus became the predominant form of Unionism, primarily between the Anglican Anglo-Irish Landlord elite and the British State in the protection of economic interests (Cullen, 1986). However, with the Catholic majority and Non-Conformist Protestant classes excluded, this led to the 1798 Irish Rebellion (Brophy, 2016). The 1801 Act of Union incorporating Ireland into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, coupled with the revocation of the Penal Laws, finally opened Unionism to Catholic Ireland and Non-Anglican Protestants (McCartney, 1979). Unionism from 1801 to 1916 not only dominated the majority Irish Protestant opinion but was also supported by some Irish Catholics and even became acknowledged as a way for Irish Nationalists to achieve their goals of self-government - revolving around achieving a Home Rule parliament in Dublin to govern Ireland, albeit as part of the United Kingdom (Ibid.).
The Birth of Ulster Loyalism - “Home Rule Means Rome Rule”
The Home Rule Movement by 1870 had come to dominate and largely unify the Irish Nationalist movement. However, for Protestant Unionists, who formed a minority within Ireland, this meant the danger of being governed by a Dublin-based Parliament dominated by a “Catholic Ascendency” of Catholic Nationalists in conjunction with the Catholic Church hierarchy, holding the possibility of religious discrimination and a threat to their economic interests (Dunn, 2010). From within this wider Irish Unionist opposition emerged in Ulster a particularly fervent strain of Unionism, that not only opposed Home Rule on religious, political, and economic grounds but also sought to emphasise a distinct regional, cultural and familial heritage of Ulster Protestantism dating back to the Protestant Plantations (Cairns, 2000). It was this ethnonationalist strain of Unionism that came to be known as “Ulster Loyalism”.
For Loyalists, Home Rule in a Catholic-dominated Ireland meant not just a loss of status, power, and economic opportunity, but a threat to the very existence of the Ulster Protestant way of life by the Roman Catholic Church, signified by the slogan “Home Rule Means Rome Rule” (Dunn, 2010). At the same time, as one of Ireland's few industrialised areas providing job opportunities, an increasing number of Catholics had migrated from other parts of the island to the north, particularly Belfast (Ibid.). This further reinforced Ulster Loyalism among Protestant working-class communities, who feared economic competition from incoming Catholics and thought this would worsen under Home Rule, increasing sectarian tensions (Ibid.). Such tensions boiled over into sectarian violence in 1886 and 1893, as British Liberal governments made repeated attempts to pass Home Rule through Parliament – culminating in the 1912 “Home Rule Crisis” (Morris, 2011).
The crisis saw 500,000 mainly Ulster-based Unionists sign the Ulster Covenant, vowing to refuse to recognise the legitimacy of Home Rule (Morris, 2011). This was matched by the formation of the 100,000-strong ´Ulster Volunteers´ militia to resist Home Rule (Brophy, 2016). The tensions threatened to spill over into civil war as Irish Nationalists formed their own ´Irish Volunteers´ militia, with the implementation of Home Rule and civil war only halted by the start of the First World War (Brophy, 2016). Loyalists from the Ulster Volunteers signed up to the British Army in droves, particularly the 36th Ulster Division, to prove their loyalty in order to dissuade future attempts at Home Rule – with their exploits and massive loss of life in the Battle of the Somme of particular significance in Loyalist memory (Cairns, 2000).
The Irish War of Independence, as discussed in the first instalment of this series, marked the final development of Unionism and Loyalism, with the strength of Protestant Unionist feelings in the North leading to the Six Protestant majority counties partitioned to form Northern Ireland (Boyce, 1970). The war marked some of the most intense sectarian violence in the North since the 1798 Irish Rebellion, as rioting, paramilitary and state violence led to the deaths of 557 people from 1920 to 1922 (Ibid.). From then on, Unionism was understood as the support and protection of Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom, in opposition to a unified Ireland – with Protestant Unionist rule and status in the North secured until the start of the Troubles.
Understanding Loyalism – “For God and Ulster”
Unlike Irish Republicanism, Ulster Loyalism does not constitute an overarching political manifesto and methodology outside of committed and often uncompromising Unionism, and can be better understood as the promotion of a specific regional Protestant ethnonationalist identity and its protection against perceived threats to its interests (Cairns, 2000). Whereas Anglican Protestant Unionism in Ireland was often a signifier of wealth and status, Loyalism´s support base was among the descendants of Scottish Presbyterians and Non-Conformists of the Ulster Plantation, who were concentrated in the poorer working-class communities of Northern Ireland (Moore & Sanders, 2002). Loyalists emphasise their strong historical and cultural ties to Scotland´s West Coast to reinforce their regional uniqueness from the rest of Ireland as a distinct Northern “Ulster” culture, which combines with a sectarian religious focus on ´staunch´ Protestant identity and heritage in opposition to the rest of Catholic Ireland – typified by the Loyalist refrain “For God and Ulster” (Moore & Sanders, 2002).
With Ulster Protestants a minority within Ireland, even if a majority within Northern Ireland, it has been argued that Loyalists thus operate with a "siege mentality" in relation to their feelings of being geographically isolated, friendless, and vulnerable (Cairns, 2000, p.445). This siege mentality in turn feeds into a strong Loyalist focus on the idea of defending their culture, often in the form of public displays of Loyalist flags, symbols and pageantry such as military, paramilitary, or Royalist regalia, along with parades, bonfires and fraternal organisations - considered important ways of displaying Loyalist identity and marking out Loyalist communities (Cairns, 2000).
Perhaps the most visible and notable aspect of Loyalist cultural symbolism is the Orange Order, named after William of Orange, affectionately known to Loyalists as “King Billy” to celebrate his Protestant victory over Catholic King James. First born in 1795, the Orange Order experienced rapid growth of popularity in the 1880s, and although it also draws membership from the wider Unionist community, it is an especially important part of Loyalist identity. The Order is best known for its yearly parades around the Twelfth of July celebrating King William's victory in the 1690 Battle of the Boyne. These parades are accompanied the night before in Loyalist communities by huge bonfires which can contain symbols of Irish Nationalism such as the Irish Tricolour. In turn, Catholics accuse these events of being triumphalist and antagonistic in nature, especially when marches pass through Catholic Nationalist communities, often sparking violence (Cairns, 2000). Indeed, to emphasise the role of Protestant ethnonationalism in Loyalist identity, the Orange Order bars non-Protestant members, and will not even accept Protestants married to Catholics.
Any attempts to limit these displays, even those parades through Catholic Nationalist areas, are often met with a virulent backlash. This is due to the belief in a zero-sum game in that giving any concessions to Nationalist's interests will weaken the already precarious Unionist position within Ireland, in turn benefitting Irish Republicanism at its expense – with a particular fear of Republican armed violence and the potential for Catholic Nationalists to support it (Cairns, 2000). This uncompromising attitude has led to the popular Loyalist rallying cry of “No Surrender”. Indeed, for Loyalists, not even the British government can be trusted to look after their interests, and from the Home Rule Movement onwards Loyalists have often come into conflict with British governments that they consider to be pandering to Irish Nationalists (Moore & Sanders, 2002). This has led to claims that Loyalist's primary loyalty is to the British Crown as the symbolic representative of the British State, rather than to the elected British government, with Loyalists flying the true and untainted banner of ´traditional´ Britishness that the rest of Britain has itself left behind (Ibid.).
Unionist and Loyalist Politics
Unionists as full adherents to the British state have always actively engaged in British Parliamentary politics – even if in opposition to British governments of the day (Smith, 2006). Furthermore, Loyalists have fiercely opposed attempts to grant the Republic of Ireland any input into Northern Irish politics (Ibid.). Unionists have furthermore at times opposed attempts to devolve political powers to the Northern Irish state, seeing this as weakening the political ties between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom (Ibid.). Following partition, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) has historically been the dominant Unionist political party, winning every Northern Irish election from 1921 until the start of the Troubles in 1969, and thereafter continuing to receive a majority of the Protestant Unionist vote throughout The Troubles (Ibid.). The party has a broadly conservative centre-right ideology, and until 1972 sat in Westminster elections as part of the British Conservative Party (Ibid.). The party’s sustained success has been down to active Unionist attempts to maintain a united electoral front, rather than splitting the Unionist vote, to allow them to continually dominate Nationalist parties in elections (Boyce, 1970).
Accordingly, the UUP has historically represented a broad and uneasy coalition, ranging from moderate Unionists to diehard Loyalists (Ibid.). The emergence of the Catholic Civil Rights movement in the 1960s led to deep fractures in the party under the leadership of moderate Unionist Terrance O´Neil, who sought concessions to the Civil Rights movement (Ibid.). This was fiercely opposed by hard-line Unionists who ultimately took control of the party in 1970, following O´Neil's resignation amongst the rising violence. The party continued to suffer deep divisions between moderates and hard-line factions throughout the Troubles, displaying the diversity of Unionist opinion and the difficulty in maintaining a united front (Smith, 2006).
However, the start of the Troubles witnessed for the first time a significant splintering of Unionist support into other parties, headed by the Loyalist stalwart Reverend Ian Paisley, who became the face of uncompromising Ulster Loyalism (Evans & Duffy, 1997). After leading the Loyalist opposition to the Catholic Civil Rights campaign with his Protestant Unionist Party (PUP), he won Terrance O´Neil´s seat in 1970 and reformed the PUP in 1971 as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – which for the duration of the Troubles acted as the main political face of hard-line Loyalism and drew away significant Ulster Protestant working-class support from the UUP (Ibid.). On the other side, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) was formed in 1970 to represent moderate non-sectarian Unionism, retaining between 6-10% of the Northern Irish vote for most of The Troubles (Ibid.)
Unionism within the British and Northern Irish State and Security
Within any study of Unionism, it is impossible to ignore the role of the British and Northern Irish States, attachment to which forms the basis of Unionist politics. Unionists dominated the Northern Irish state before the Troubles, including the Parliament, judiciary, and police in a form of majoritarian rule (Hearty, 2017). This had a particularly strong impact on Northern Irish security and policing. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as Northern Ireland's police force was widely regarded by Nationalists as biased in favour of Protestants, if not openly sectarian, with an over 80% Protestant membership (Murray, 2004). This included Loyalist members of the Orange Order and even members of Loyalist Paramilitaries. The RUC militia known as the “B-Specials” were particularly notorious for violently partisan policing against Nationalist communities (Ibid.). This meant that the RUC was inherently unfit to act as a neutral peacekeeping force before the Troubles, showing instead a tendency to violently disperse peaceful civil rights demonstrations, or else to allow Loyalist counter-demonstrators to attack them (Dochartaigh, 1997). This was a major cause of the spiralling violence and intercommunal tensions leading to the Troubles. The B-Specials were disbanded in 1970 and replaced with the “Ulster Defence Regiment” as a branch of the British Army, recruiting only within Northern Ireland, to take on the RUC's militarised duties whilst being barred from crowd control duties, with the intention of creating a cross-community security force (Hearty, 2017). In reality, the 18% Catholic recruits in 1970 quickly dropped to 3% by 1972 – creating yet another Protestant-dominated security force.
For elected British governments Northern Ireland has often constituted a difficult issue, with the State feeling ideologically obliged on one hand to support British Unionism, whereas at the same time seeking to maintain stability including concessions to Irish Nationalism. Loyalists, driven by the belief that the British state does not understand or care for their cause, have frequently tried to strong-arm British governments into taking an active interest in supporting Northern Irish Unionism (Moore & Sanders, 2002). The combative Loyalist response to attempts by the British government to introduce Home Rule, including the threat of escalating violence, provided a blueprint for future Loyalist-British relations leading into the Troubles. For the British government, the Protestant Unionist majoritarianism before the start of the Troubles was a time of welcome stability, with little need to regard the Catholic Nationalist position. However, the rising violence preceding the Troubles signalled a shocking and unwelcome development, with Loyalism’s uncompromising tendencies becoming a difficult hurdle to navigate (Ibid.). At multiple points during the Troubles, Loyalists sought to actively block British attempts to agree on power-sharing arrangements, with significant inputs from Nationalists and from the Republic of Ireland, as a solution to the Troubles: these were indeed considered unconscionable concessions (Moore & Sanders, 2002). In 1969 the British government's Hunt Report, seeking to reform the protestant-dominated RUC in favour of a less sectarian institution, was met by Loyalist rioting in response (Dochartaigh, 1997)
This partisan nature of Northern Irish policing ultimately led to the deployment of the British Army to try and fill a non-sectarian policing and peacekeeping role. Yet, the Army´s experience was in fighting bloody Counter Insurgency wars of decolonisation overseas, or else training to fight a high-intensity Third World War against the Soviet Union in an aggressive combat role, both of which made the Army unsuitable for policing Northern Ireland's streets (Ibid.). Once they began to come under attack from Republican paramilitaries, they soon switched to treating Catholic Nationalists as a hostile population with combatting PIRA as their main focus, ultimately coming to be seen as yet another actively Unionist security force falling on the de facto side of Loyalists - and contributing to the explosion of the Troubles (Ibid.). Indeed Loyalists, initially unimpressed by the Army´s peacekeeping focus and hostile to the Army's policing actions in Loyalist communities, welcomed and even actively encouraged the British Army´s switch to more aggressive actions directed at the Irish Nationalist community (Ibid.).
Loyalist paramilitarism originated with the formation of the Ulster Volunteers in 1912 to oppose Home Rule. During the War of Independence, after the Ulster Volunteers had returned from British Army service, they engaged in the sectarian violence engulfing Northern Ireland – establishing a twin pattern of being willing to violently oppose perceived political concessions and to engage in sectarian killings (Boyne, 1970). Loyalist paramilitarism again surfaced in 1966 among the rising tensions of the Civil Rights movement, attracting Loyalist recruits often disaffected with mainstream Unionist politics (Ferguson et al, 2015). The two main Loyalists groups were the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), claiming to be the descendants of the original Ulster Volunteers, with around 7,500 members throughout the Troubles, and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) formed in 1971 as an umbrella organisation of several armed groups, peaking in 1972 with tens of thousands of members (Ibid.). Alongside this were several smaller groups and splinter factions, who often emerged to escalate armed violence during periods of ceasefire or perceived concessions.
Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for around 28% of all deaths in the Troubles, numbering close to 1,000 people (Ibid.). However, what made Loyalist paramilitary violence especially distinct was its very high proportion of civilian victims – with over 80% of Loyalist victims accounting for the 48% of civilian deaths during the Troubles (Ibid.). This was due to Loyalist paramilitaries considering a legitimate strategy the open sectarian murders and massacres of Catholic civilians in retaliation for IRA activities, with Catholic Nationalists as a whole seen as potential sympathisers, supporters or recruits of the IRA (Moore & Sanders, 2002). Of particular Loyalist resentment was the murder of off-duty and retired security personnel by Republican paramilitaries, which they considered sectarian killings that validated Loyalist sectarian tit-for-tat retaliation against civilians (Ferguson et al, 2015). It was hoped this strategy of open terror against Catholics would sap the IRA of its support base and convince them to lay down arms.
Loyalist strategy ultimately incorporated bombings, sectarian murders and massacres, kidnappings, and assassinations of politicians and Republican paramilitaries, as well as violent internal feuds (Ibid.). Much like other Republican paramilitaries, armed Loyalist factions also engaged in criminal activity, including armed robbery and drug dealing to raise funds, as well as cross-border weapon smuggling for armaments (Ibid.). By using cover names to claim responsibility for violent actions, such as the “Ulster Freedom Fighters” of the UDA, Loyalist paramilitaries were also able to publicly parade under their legitimate names (Ibid.). Even more controversially, some Loyalist paramilitary members were themselves active members of the RUC and UDR, and by the 1980s there even emerged accusations of active collusion with British security and intelligence forces to target suspected PIRA members (McGovern,2013).
Conclusions: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Ireland
As illustrated, Unionism has a long history in Ireland, which since the Sixteenth Century has been intrinsically tied to Protestantism as a symbol of loyalty to the Crown and British State. Simultaneously, the migration of English and Scottish Protestants to Ireland over two centuries has left a legacy of competing sources of minority Protestant Unionist identity within Ireland, particularly in the North. This in turn directly shaped the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom in the lead-up to the Troubles. Furthermore, the stratification of Protestantism into Anglican and Non-Conformism led to the former being favoured with political and economic power, whilst simultaneously providing a competing source of working-class Protestant identity in the latter. Developments within Irish Nationalism and the British State led to the formation of Loyalism as a working-class Ulster Protestant-based ethnonational backlash against the threat of Catholic majority rule in Ireland. Loyalism’s siege mentality has led to an uncompromising face of Unionism, that directly fed into and exasperated the sectarian nature of Northern Irish politics and policing, leading to an uneasy and sometimes contradictory relationship with the British state. Finally, Loyalist attitudes directly fed into the brutal sectarian nature of Loyalist paramilitarism that contributed significantly to the violence of the Troubles.
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Figure 1: Garcia del Sola, B. (2019). A Loyalist mural in Belfast, Northern Ireland [Photograph]. Flickr. Retrieved from: https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/9281-uk-seizes-property-linked-to-n-irish-paramilitary-group Figure 2: DRB (2014). Early Loyalist mural depicting King Billy [Photograph]. DRB Group. Retrieved from: https://drbgroup1.wordpress.com/tag/festival-theatre/ Figure 3: Dorney, J. (1886). 1886 Anti-Home Rule Riots in Belfast [Illustration]. The Irish Story. Retrieved from: https://www.theirishstory.com/2013/01/09/belfast-riots-a-short-history/#.Yn9Tw4zP0dV Figure 4: Unknown (1912). Thousands of Ulster Volunteers line up to protest against Home Rule [Photograph]. BBC. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-19718680 Figure 5: Unknown (1916). The 36th (Ulster) Division at the Somme [Photograph]. Belfast Tepegraph. Retrieved from: https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/archive/events/untold-stories-of-the-horrors-of-war-to-mark-somme-centenary-34784621.html Figure 6: Feenan, N. (2020). 36th Ulster Division Mural and modern UVF Memorial Bloomfield Walkway [Photograph]. Flickr. Retrieved from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/20923094@N04/49852083676 Figure 7: Kilcoyne, C. (2017). Participants in an Orange Order parade march past a bonfire pyre in Portadown, Northern Ireland [Photograph]. The Atlantic. Retrieved from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/protestant-parade-northern-ireland/533151/ Figure 8: Ardfern (2009). Mural in The Fountain area, Derry, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, August 2009 [Photgraph]. Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fountain_%2801%29.JPG Figure 9: United Press International (1981). The Rev. Ian Paisley, a Protestant rabble-rouser in Northern Ireland, in 1981. Once a force behind the Troubles, he agreed in 2007 to end the strife [Photograph]. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/europe/ian-paisley-northern-ireland-leader-dies.html Figure 10: Unknown (1969). Manifestación pacífica disuelta por los lealistas B-Specials [Translate: “Peaceful demonstration dissolved by loyalist B-Specials”] [Photograph]. Descifrando La Guerra. Retrieved from: https://www.descifrandolaguerra.es/una-isla-dividida-y-un-conflicto-armado/ Figure 11: Callaghan, M. (2016). A ´terrorist´ mural, East Belfast, March 2016. [Photograph]. Brill. Retrieved from: https://brill.com/view/book/9789004407947/BP000014.xml. Figure 12: Lewis, A. (2019). Dissident loyalist paramilitary groups carried out two punishment shootings and 43 other punishment attacks in 2019 [Photograph]. Daily Record. Retrieved from: https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/paramilitary-punishment-stats-reveal-scale-21148118. Figure 13: Murphy, W. (2017). Loyalist Paramilitary Murals on the Shankill [Photograph]. Flickr. Retrieved from: https://theculturetrip.com/europe/united-kingdom/northern-ireland/articles/how-did-the-shankill-road-become-northern-irelands-most-notorious-street/